Supreme Court

Prem Prakash Vs. Santosh Kumar Jain & Sons (HUF) and Ors.

MANU/SC/1061/2017

30.08.2017

Tenancy

When eviction is sought on the ground of sub-letting, the onus to prove sub-letting is on the landlord

Present appeal is against the final judgment passed by the High Court of Delhi whereby learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the eviction petition filed by the Original Owner-Respondent No. 1 while setting aside the judgments passed by the Court of Additional Rent Controller, and the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, respectively. The only point for consideration before this Court is whether in the present facts and circumstances of case, the order of eviction passed by the High Court was just and proper.

The initial burden to prove that the sub-tenant is in exclusive possession of the property is on the owner, however, the onus to prove the exclusive possession of the sub tenant is that of preponderance of probability only and he has to prove the same prima facie only and if he succeeds then the burden to rebut the same lies on the tenant.

In Associated Hotels of India Ltd., Delhi v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, it was held that, when eviction is sought on the ground of sub-letting, the onus to prove sub-letting is on the landlord. If the landlord prima-facie shows that, the occupant who was in exclusive possession of the premises let out for valuable consideration, it would then be for the tenant to rebut the evidence. Again, in Kala and Anr. v. Madho Parshad Vaidya, this Court reiterated the very same principle. It was observed that, the burden of proof of sub-letting is on the landlord but once he establishes parting of possession by the tenant to third party, the onus would shift on the tenant to explain his possession. If he is unable to discharge that onus, it is permissible for the court to raise an inference that such possession was for monetary consideration. Further, in Vaishakhi Ram and Ors. v. Sanjeev Kumar Bhatiani, it was held that, it is well settled that the burden of proving sub-letting is on the landlord but if the landlord proves that the sub-tenant is in exclusive possession of the suit premises, then the onus is shifted to the tenant to prove that it was not a case of sub-letting.

Sub-tenancy or sub-letting comes into existence, when the tenant gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof. This arrangement comes about under a mutual agreement or understanding between tenant and the person to whom the possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out of the scene. Rather, the scene is enacted behind the back of the landlord, concealing the overt acts and transferring possession clandestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the landlord, in the sense that, the landlord had not let out the premises to that person nor had he allowed or consented to his entering into possession of that person, instead of the tenant, which ultimately reveals to the landlord that the tenant to whom the property was let out has put some other person in possession of that property. In such a situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding between the tenant and the sub-tenant.

It would also be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom the property had been sub-let had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub-lease. It may be paid in cash or in kind or may have been paid or promised to be paid. It may have been paid in lump sum in advance covering the period for which the premises is let out or sub-let or it may have been paid or promised to be paid periodically. Since, payment of rent or monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the Court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case.

In the present facts and circumstances of the case, Supreme Court opined that, the original owner-Respondent No. 1 has proved beyond doubt that, the property is in exclusive possession of the sub-tenant and the Appellant has not been able to deny the claim of sub-tenancy in favour of Respondent No. 2. The absence of evidence and failure to discharge the onus lay heavy on Appellant and there could be no presumption other than that the suit premises had been sublet and parted with possession by the Appellant to the Respondent No. 2. High Court was right in setting aside the orders passed by the lower Courts.

Relevant

Associated Hotels of India Ltd., Delhi v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit SinghMANU/SC/0333/1967
: AIR 1968 SC 933; Kala and Anr. v. Madho Parshad Vaidya MANU/SC/0571/1998
: (1998) 6 SCC 573; Vaishakhi Ram and Ors. v. Sanjeev Kumar Bhatiani MANU/SC/7197/2008
: (2008) 14 SCC 356; Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur

Tags : Subletting Eviction Grant

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Supreme Court

Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors.

MANU/SC/1053/2017

28.08.2017

Sales Tax/VAT

State Governments have power to levy sales tax on value of material in execution of the works contract

In facts of present case, in the year 1954, the State Government of Rajasthan enacted Rajasthan Sales Tax Act in order to tax the sales and purchase of any goods. The Assessee is a company engaged in manufacturing and laying of pipelines for water supply schemes. The Public Health and Engineering Department ('PHED') of the State Government invited tenders for providing and laying of pipes complete with suitable jointing material specials, valves and construction of valve chamber, anchor blocks table crossing, including testing and commissioning of pipelines. On August 23, 1988, a work order was issued by PHED in favour of the Assessee and the Assessee, under the contracts/agreement dated January 11, 1989, agreed to provide PSC pipes manufactured by it and had entered into the contracts with PHED for providing and laying of pipelines. The issue that, has arisen in instant appeals is as to whether works contract given to the Assessee is divisible in nature, in facts of the case, and hence, the imposition of tax and penalty made under Section 7AA of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 is justifiable and sustainable in law.

In instant case, there is no dispute that, contract in question was a works contract. The issue is altogether different, namely, that of divisibility. It may be mentioned that, before Article 366(29A) of the Constitution was amended with effect from March 01, 1983, the test applicable was 'dominant nature test' or 'degree of intention' or 'overwhelming component test' or 'degree of labour and service test'. This Court in Larsen and Toubro Limited and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Anr. clarified that, post amendment, i.e. with effect from March 01, 1983, these tests are no longer applicable. It is also made clear that, the works contract is an indivisible contract, but, by legal fiction, is divided into two parts, one for the sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services.

The history of legislative and constitutional amendment pertaining to works contract is well known, which has been stated and restated by this Court in number of cases. The entire position is summarised in State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Pro Lab case wherein it was summed up that, it follows from the reading of the judgment in Larsen and Toubro case that, after insertion of Clause (29-A) in Article 366, the works contract which was indivisible one by legal fiction, altered into a contract, which is permitted to be bifurcated into two: one for "sale of goods" and the other for "services", thereby making goods component of the contract exigible to sales tax. Further, while going into this exercise of divisibility, dominant intention behind such a contract, namely, whether it was for sale of goods or for services, is rendered otiose or immaterial. It follows, as a sequitur, that by virtue of Clause (29-A) of Article 366, the State Legislature is now empowered to segregate the goods part of the works contract and impose sales tax thereupon. It may be noted that, Entry 54 of List II of Schedule VII to the Constitution of India empowers the State Legislature to enact a law taxing sale of goods. Sales tax, being a subject-matter of the State List, the State Legislature has the competency to legislate over the subject.

It clearly follows from the above that, by virtue of the Forty Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, a single and indivisible contract is now brought on par with a contract containing two separate agreements. It has also now become a settled position in law that, the State Governments have power to levy sales tax on value of material in execution of the works contract. This position is brought about by creating friction whereby the transfer of moveable property in a works contract is deemed to be sale, even though it may not be well within the meaning of Sale of Goods Act. In Larsen and Toubro case, it was further held that, value of goods which can constitute a measure of levy of the tax has to be the value of goods at the time of incorporation of the goods in the works even though property in goods passes later. Taxing the sale of goods element in a works contract is permissible even after incorporation of goods, provided tax is directed to the value of goods at the time of incorporation and does not purport to tax the transfer of immovable property.

In present case, assessing authority, after scrutinising the agreement in question between the Assessee and the State Government, returned a finding of fact that, manufacture and supply of PSC pipes, jointing material specials, valves, anchor blocks, etc. do not fall within the scopes of buildings, bridges, dams, roads and canals. It was also held that, the agreement was clearly in two parts, namely, (i) sale and supply of PSC pipes, jointing material specials, valves, anchor blocks, etc. and (ii) the remaining part being supply of labour and services. These findings are upheld not only by the appellate authority but also by the Single Judge of the High Court as well as the Division Bench of the High Court. At this stage that the Assessee has, in fact, admitted that, it had no grievance against the finding that, supply of pipes was nothing but the sale of pipes involved in the execution of the contracts and, therefore, it was excisable to sales tax. In view of the findings recorded by the authorities below, this element of sale of goods shall apply to jointing material specials, valves, anchor blocks, etc. as well. Thus, there is no infirmity in impugned judgment of the High Court.

Relevant

State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Pro Lab and Ors. MANU/SC/0084/2015
: (2015) 8 SCC 557; Larsen and Toubro Limited and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Anr. MANU/SC/0985/2013
: (2014) 1 SCC 708

Tags : Works contract Exemption Entitlement

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High Court of Bombay

Rajendra Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

MANU/MH/1913/2017

24.08.2017

Criminal

Power to transfer investigation from one agency to another has to be exercised sparingly

By present writ petition, the Petitioner has, prayed for handing over of investigation of his complaint submitted before the Respondent No. 1 to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) or to any other independent investigating agency, with a further prayer for direction for registration of First Information Report (FIR) on the basis of the said complaint. It is the contention of Petitioner that, the Petitioner has no faith in the Respondent No. 1, the investigating agency in the present case. Further, it is submitted that, the actions of the Respondent No. 1 have led to an apprehension in the mind of the Petitioner that, the entire investigation has been unfair and that, therefore, it is necessary that the case needs to be transferred to an independent investigating agency.

The Supreme Court in case of Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana, has held in the context of power of Constitutional Courts to transfer and/or to order fresh investigation or re-investigation, when fair trial may be quite difficult unless there is a fair investigation. Although, Supreme Court in said decision has cautioned that the power to transfer investigation from one agency to another has to be exercised sparingly, it has been emphasized that the sanctity and purity of genuine investigation has to be ensured. In said decision, the Supreme Court transferred the investigation to CBI even when the trial had commenced and some witnesses had been examined.

In the criminal justice system, fair and impartial and truthful investigation is of greatest significance so that, faith of the citizen in the system is reinforced. A fair trial also depends on the manner of investigation. If there is any indication of either callousness or highhandedness in functioning of the Investigating Agency, the very root of the criminal justice system is adversely affected. To set the criminal law in motion to facilitate the settlement of private scores or civil disputes, would amount to abuse of power by the competent authority. Similarly, failure to set the criminal law in motion in genuine cases to facilitate the settlement of private scores or civil disputes, amounts to abdication of function by the competent authority. The Police Station cannot be a place to be used where the private disputes between the parties can be settled by the Police Officers by their acts of commission or omission and under the threat of putting into motion criminal law on the basis of the complaint made by either party to the dispute.

In the present case, right from the first instance, when Respondent Nos. 4 and 7 submitted three complaints, making more and more grave allegations against the Petitioner till the stage of inordinate delay in registering FIR on the complaint of the Petitioner against the said Respondents, the Respondent No. 1 - Investigating Authority has not acted in a fair, truthful and impartial manner. The Investigating Authority is expected to professionally conduct investigation with promptitude and without taking sides. In the face of such conduct of Respondent No. 1, the investigation does not inspire confidence and the entire process is vitiated.

The investigation in respect of both the first information reports in the present case wherein Respondent No. 4 is the complainant and FIR wherein the Petitioner is the complainant ought to be transferred to an independent investigating agency. Ends of justice would be met, if the said two FIRs and consequent investigation are transferred to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to be investigated by an Officer not less than the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. Accordingly, said two FIRs are directed to be transferred to the CID. The officer of the CID so deputed shall conduct further investigation into both the matters and file a report before the trial Court at the earliest, so as to ensure fair trial for both sets of complaints in the present matter.

Relevant

Dharam Pal vs. State of Haryana and Ors. MANU/SC/0118/2016
; Afak Shabbir Khan vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. MANU/MH/1467/2012

Tags : Case Investigation Transfer

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High Court of Delhi

Sadhu Forging Limited Vs. Continental Engines Ltd.

MANU/DE/2475/2017

24.08.2017

Civil

Additional documents can be filed only with the leave of the Court

Plaintiff filed the present suit seeking a decree for a sum of Rs 1,48,39,218/- along with interest pendent lite and future. Pursuant to completion of pleadings, Plaintiffs witness PW-1 entered appearance and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit. During the cross-examination of PW-1, Plaintiff filed affidavit of another witness without him being named in the list of witnesses and along with affidavit of PW-2 filed number of documents without seeking leave of the Court. Hence, learned counsel for the Defendant objected to validity of affidavit of PW-2 and the additional documents filed. Faced with this situation, Plaintiff filed an application under Order XVIII Rule 4 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which was heard by the learned Joint Registrar and same was dismissed vide impugned order. Hence, present appeal. Issue in the present appeal arises is, whether by examining witnesses not mentioned in the list of witnesses, Plaintiff can introduce additional documents which had not been filed earlier either with the plaint or before settlement of issues.

In the present case, issues were settled on 10th May, 2011 and the parties were directed to file their list of witnesses within four weeks with a further direction to the Plaintiff to file his evidence within four weeks. Despite opportunities, evidence by way of affidavit of the Plaintiff's witnesses was not filed and finally on 5th July, 2012 evidence by way of PW-1 duly authorized representative of the Plaintiff's company was filed. It was further re-filed on 31st July, 2012. On 10th April, 2013 PW-1 tendered his affidavit and was examined-in-chief and partly cross-examined. Thereafter cross-examination of PW-1 continued, when Plaintiff filed IA No. 18974/2014 under Order XI Rule 14 of CPC followed by IA No. 7107/2016 under Order XVIII Rule 4 of CPC. No doubt, Plaintiff can examine as many witnesses it wishes to especially when Plaintiff's witness is not required to be summoned even though not mentioned in the list of witnesses.

On a plain reading of Order VII Rule 14 of CPC, it is evident that, the Plaintiff is mandated to file documents to support its claim along with the plaint and a document which ought to be produced in Court by the Plaintiff, when the plaint was presented but has not been produced, shall not be received in evidence on behalf of the said party without the leave of the Court.

The present application is not under Order VII Rule 14(3) of CPC but under Order XVIII Rule 4 of CPC. However, mere invocation of a different provision of law will not entail dismissal of the application, if the facts have been properly elaborated. In I.A. No. 7107/2016 which can be treated to have been wrongly filed under Order XVIII Rule 4 of CPC, the case of the Plaintiff is that, there is no bar to placing such documents along with the affidavit and no prejudice has been caused to the Defendant, thus the document can be taken on record. It is further stated that, the witness who is producing the said documents has dealt with the Defendant and is in a position to prove said documents. The Plaintiff/Applicant has sought leave of the Court to place the documents along with evidence of PW-2.

It is well-settled that procedure is the handmade of justice. It is undisputed that, even at this stage, a party can file documents but with the leave of the Court. The Plaintiff cannot be non-suited from filing the documents it seeks to rely upon even at this stage. Though in the decision Nishant Hannan, this Court was dealing with unimpeachable documents, however the fact remains that under Order VII Rule 14 CPC read with Section 151 of CPC, the Plaintiff can file additional documents with the leave of the Court, when the Plaintiffs evidence is going on. Provision under Order VII Rule 14 of CPC is essentially to assist parties and the Court in adjudication of the dispute. Consequently, the Appeal is disposed of setting aside the impugned order passed by Joint Registrar.

Relevant

Nishant Hannan & Ors. v. South Delhi Municipal Corporation

Tags : Additional documents Filing Court Leave

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Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal

Inter Globe Aviation Limited Vs. CC, New Delhi

MANU/CE/0598/2017

23.08.2017

Customs

When the actual cost towards handling charges are available, notional addition is not legally tenable

The Appellant is engaged in air transport business both in domestic and international sector. They operate some of their air crafts in domestic sector and continue the service in international sector also. The Aviation Turbine Fuel (AFT) is filled by the Appellant for domestic flight operation. When the same aircraft is to embark on an international travel, the ATF in the fuel tank is considered as cleared outside India and when the aircraft returns from foreign trip, the ATF left over/available in the aircraft is considered to be an import item subjected to customs duty as per the applicable rates. The dispute in present case mainly revolves around the valuation of ATF available in fuel tank of aircraft returning from the foreign trip to continue travel in domestic sector. The Appellants were considering the price at which the international Airlines purchases ATF from Indian Oil Corporation. Such price formed the basis of assessable value with addition of 1.125% as insurance charges and 1% as handling charges. The customs duty was discharged by the Appellant on ATF available in such aircrafts returning from international trips on a monthly basis, by adjusting from the advance deposit maintained by them with the Department.

The Revenue entertained a view that, for valuation of ATF available on remnant fuel in the returning aircraft, the Appellants are liable to add 20% as notional freight charges in terms of Rule 10(2) of Customs Valuation Rules. The proceedings initiated against Appellant resulted in confirmation of demand of differential customs duty. A penalty of Rs. 5 lakh was imposed on the Appellant under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962/Act.

The consumption of fuel depends on various factors. Factually, when the aircraft completes the inward journey to reach the Indian Airport, certain quantity of fuel is left in the tanks. There should not be a freight element attributable to such fuel in the tank. The aircraft did not transport the fuel as a cargo or goods for the purpose of freight. Such interpretation will be a result of hyper-technical approach to the facts of the case.

Admittedly, the remnant fuel is construed to be an imported item for the purpose of customs duty. In the importation of such remnant fuel, there cannot be any separate freight element, which can be added in the assessable value. The fuel in the tank is part of aircraft in operation. Fuel cost is calculated, and apparently, forms part of commercial consideration while fixing ticket charges for transporting aircraft. No freight element is attributable to fuel in the tank, the usage of which varies on different parameters. The aircraft did not transport ATF on which a freight element can be attributed. The plain meaning of 'Freight' is goods that are transported by ships, planes, trains or lorries/trucks; the system of transporting goods in this way. On this basis, it cannot be said that, fuel in the tank of aircraft used for propulsion can be considered as cargo/goods with attributable cost of freight. Further, Rule 10(2) was applied by the lower authority on the ground that, the freight of ATF is not ascertainable. There is no freight element involved and hence, there is no application for Rule 10(2).

The Supreme Court in Wipro Ltd., held that normally, the value of imported goods has to be the transactional value which means the price "actually paid" or "payable" for the goods imported. When the value of transaction could not be determined then the Rules are applied to arrive at the value. The endeavour is to have closest proximity with the actual price. Dealing with addition of loading and handling charges at 1% on notional basis as per Rule 9 of Valuation Rules, the Apex Court held that when the actual cost towards handling charges are available, notional addition is not legally tenable. It was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the present case, there is no freight involved with reference to left over fuel in the tank of an operating aircraft. Hence, there is no question such freight being 'not ascertainable' and hence addition of 20% notional freight.

The Commissioner, Airport, Mumbai vide his instructions dated 20th October, 2006 clarified that, in the absence of invoice for ATF, the price at which Indian Airlines purchase ATF for international flight can be considered for valuation. In such situation, it will not be tenable to add a further notional freight of 20% to arrive at the assessable value. On this ground also, impugned order is not sustainable.

Regarding liability of the Appellant for penalty under Section 112 of Act, impugned order observed that, the Appellants failed to follow the procedure of filing bill of entry and valuing the ATF properly. Admittedly, the Appellants have been filing details of arrival of aircraft from foreign trip along with quantity of fuel etc. On arrival re-conciliation of quantity of fuel along with duty payable is also submitted. Duty payment is made through adjustment of pre-deposit made with the customs. This practice has been continuing for many years. In such factual position, it is not tenable for the Revenue to take up a decision that, there is a violation of procedure and the Appellant is liable to penalty under Section 112 of Act. The Original Authority did not mention under which sub-category of the provisions of Section 112 of Act, the Appellant is held liable for penalty. No loss of revenue has been alleged except for non-addition of notional fright in the value of ATF. Such notional additional is not legally sustainable. There is no sustainable reason for imposing penalty on the Appellant under Section 112 of Act. Impugned order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.

Relevant

Wipro Ltd. vs. Assistant Collector of Customs and Ors. MANU/SC/0468/2015

Tags : Demand Penalty Confirmation Legality

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High Court of Delhi

Ahuja Builders Vs. Doonvalley Technopolis Pvt. Ltd.

MANU/DE/2441/2017

23.08.2017

Arbitration

When there is no dispute between the parties relating to the contract containing an arbitration clause, the arbitration clause cannot be invoked

The undisputed facts relevant for the determination of the present application is that, the Defendant had awarded the Balance Civil & Structural Works, of Radisson Hotel & Metropolis Mall to the Plaintiff vide Contract Agreement. The said agreement contains the arbitration Clause No. 13, pursuant to which, all the disputes arising out of the Contract had to be referred to the Arbitrator. On completion of said work and after a discussion between parties, Defendant determined a sum of Rs. 2,72,04,349/- as due and payable by them to the Plaintiff. The Defendant wrote a letter dated 1st April, 2013 confirming the aforesaid outstanding amount towards running bills of the Plaintiff and undertook to clear it by 15th May, 2013. The Plaintiff did not dispute the said amount and waited for the payment. The Defendant, however, did not pay the said sum within the stipulated time and thereafter, the Plaintiff served a legal notice, calling upon the Defendant to pay the said sum along with the interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Upon failure of the Defendant to make the payment pursuant to the legal notice, present suit under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) has been filed. The question for determination thus is whether there is any dispute between the parties, which needs to be referred to Arbitrator and the suit is barred in view of the arbitration clause, contained in Contract Agreement.

Learned counsel for the Defendant has argued that, even if the liability to make the payment has been admitted, still the suit does not lie in view of Sections 5 & 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996/Act and the dispute need to be referred to the Arbitrator. Further, that Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act would have the primacy over Order XXXVII of CPC and if the conditions laid down in Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act are fulfilled, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred.

There was an arbitration agreement between the parties and any dispute arising under the Contract is needed to be referred to the Arbitrator. Under Clause 13 of said Contract Agreement, what is referable is 'a dispute arising out of or in any way connected with Contract Agreement'. Under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 a judicial authority is mandated to refer "the dispute". For referral the existence of 'Dispute' is sine qua non. The Plaintiff contends that, since the money payable under the Contract was calculated by the Defendant and the calculation is accepted by the Plaintiff as it is, there exists no dispute between them in relation to the terms of Contract. The applicant/Defendant has also not contended anywhere that, there is any dispute between the parties relating to the amount payable under the Contract or of any other nature. Its plea is based on mere existence of arbitration Clause 13 in the Contract.

The present suit is filed for the recovery of the said amount under Order XXXVII of CPC. It is a simple case of recovery of money based on acknowledgement and undertaking to pay. In view of these facts, it is clear that none of the parties has raised any dispute arising out of the said Contract. When there is no dispute between the parties relating to the contract containing an arbitration clause, the arbitration clause cannot be invoked.

An analysis of Section 8 of Act, would show that for its applicability, the following conditions must be satisfied: (a) that there exists an arbitration agreement; (b) that action has been brought to the Court by one party to the arbitration agreement against the other party; (c) that the subject matter of the suit is same as the subject matter of the arbitration agreement; (d) that the other party before he submits his first statement of the substance of the dispute, moves the Court for referring the parties to arbitration; and (e) that along with the application the other party tenders the original arbitration agreement or duly certified copy thereof.

Section 8 of Act, is in the form of legislative command to the Court and once the pre-requisite conditions as aforestated are satisfied, the court must refer the parties to arbitration. As a matter of fact, on fulfillment of conditions of Section 8, no option is left to the court and the court has to refer the parties to arbitration. In this case, the Defendant/Applicant has not so far raised any dispute relating to the terms and conditions of the Contract Agreement.

The law propounded in both Nathani case and National Insurance case by the Supreme Court is that, on voluntary settlement between the parties leaving no outstanding claim or pending disputes, the Contract stands discharged as to the satisfaction of both the parties and there exists no arbitrable dispute. In view of facts and circumstances of the case, there exists no dispute to refer for arbitration in terms of Section 8 of Act. The application has no merit and the same is dismissed.

Relevant

National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd. MANU/SC/4056/2008
, Nathani Steels Ltd. v. Associated Constructions

Tags : Dispute Existence Reference

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