Judgments
Supreme Court
Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 551)
MANU/SC/0769/2024
24.07.2024
Banking
Authorized signatory of the company shall not be considered as a 'drawer' of cheque, and could not be directed to pay the interim compensation
The present appeals are filed challenging the judgments and orders passed by the Bombay High Court, whereby the High Court allowed the criminal application filed by the present respondents thereby setting aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate directing the interim payment under Section 143-A, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 to be paid by the directors of the company on whose account the dishonored cheque was drawn.
The primary issue was whether the signatory of the cheque, authorized by the "Company", is the "drawer" and whether such signatory could be directed to pay interim compensation in terms of section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 leaving aside the company?
The Bombay High Court has rejected the submission to include authorized signatories in the definition of "drawer" and emphasized that wordings of Section 143A of Act, which targets the drawer of the cheque, regardless of whether it is an individual or a business, does not impose liability on authorized signatories.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court made a distinction between the legal identity of the company and its authorized signatory, noting that since they are separate legal entities, therefore, the authorized signatory's act to issue cheque on behalf of the company does not assume the company's legal identity, and they can't be held liable for the default committed by the company. Thus, the High Court’s decision to interpret 'drawer' strictly as the issuer of the cheque, excluding authorized signatories, is well-founded and the authorized signatory only acts on behalf of the company to issue the cheque, and such an act of the authorized signatory would not make him drawer of the cheque.
Therefore, Division Bench of Supreme Court upheld the judgment of Bombay High Court which held that the authorized signatory of the company could not be regarded as drawer of the cheque to attract the liability under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881.
Tags : Authorized Signatory Drawer Interim Compensation
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Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal
Flyover Cargo Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Customs-New Delhi (Airport and General)
MANU/CE/0252/2024
24.07.2024
Customs
Attempt to export Specialised Chemicals, Organisms, Machinery, Equipment and Technology (SCOMET) items without the required authorization is a serious violation
The Appellant is a licensed customs broker and is aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner, Customs (Airport and General), New Delhi revoking its Customs Broker Licence, under Regulations 14 & 18 read with Regulation 17 of Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations (CBLR) 2018, forfeiting its security deposit and imposing a penalty of Rs. 50,000 on it for violating Regulation 10(d) of CBLR.
The Appellant has filed a shipping bill for its client to export certain goods including Triethanolamine. Triethanolamine is one of the SCOMET items which have dual use- several normal industrial or other uses and is used in manufacture of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
Export of SCOMET items is not prohibited but restricted under the Foreign Trade Policy and listed in Appendix 3 to Schedule 2 of ITC (HS) classification. List 1C of this Schedule lists chemicals whose export requires an export authorisation if they are exported to countries other than those listed in Table 1. Undisputedly, Triethanolamine is listed at S. No. 17 of the list as SCOMET Entry IC017 and Mozambique was not listed in Table 1. Therefore, the undisputed legal position is that during the relevant period, Triethanolamine could not have been exported to Mozambique without an authorisation and the exporter had no authorisation.
The primary issue that was raised in this matter was whether the appellant violated Regulation 10(d) of Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations (CBLR) 2018? If violating happened, then is the penalty of revocation of licence, forfeiture of security deposit and imposition of penalty of Rs. 50,000/- upon the appellant proportionate to the violation?
It was observed that Regulation 10(d) requires the Customs Broker to advise his client to comply with the provisions of the Act, other allied Acts and the rules and regulations thereof. The customs broker is expected to be familiar with the restrictions and prohibitions on imports and exports under any law and advise the client about them.
The restriction on export in this case is evident as it was part of the Foreign Trade Policy and export of Triethanolamine to Mozambique required an authorization. Instead of advising the client, the appellant filed the Shipping Bill for its export. Therefore, the appellant had clearly violated Regulations 10(d) of CBLR 2018.
Another issue raised pertains to the question of proportionality of action against the appellant?
It was observed that an attempt to export SCOMET item without the required authorization is a serious violation. Triethanolamine was explicitly indicated as a SCOMET item. However, there is no evidence of the appellant profiting from this attempted export of Triethanolamine, and action has already been taken against the exporter and the appellant. To meet the ends of justice, penalty of Rs. 50,000/-imposed on the appellant is upheld but the revocation of license and forfeiture of security deposit are set aside. The appeal was partly allowed.
Tags : Export Authorisation SCOMET
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Supreme Court
Gene Campaign & Another v. Union of India (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 545)
MANU/SC/0743/2024
23.07.2024
Civil
Supreme Court delivered a Split verdict on commercial release of Genetically Modified Mustard
The Hon’ble Supreme Court heard several PILs challenging the Central government’s decision to allow for commercial cultivation and release of Genetically Modified (GM) Mustard, christened ’HT Mustard DMH-11’, into the environment. In 2022, the GEAC had cleared a proposal for the commercial cultivation of GM mustard.
The primary question was whether commercial sale of GM Mustard should be allowed in India or not on which the Court rendered a split verdict. Justice Nagarathna while ruling against permitting commercial sale and release of GM Mustard in India observed that the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC) had approved GM Mustard sale without relying on any indigenous studies on the effect of GM Mustard in India and its possible environmental ramifications. On the Other hand, Justice Karol approved the commercial sale of GM Mustard and stated that the composition of the GEAC is in accordance with rules and therefore the approval granted by GEAC is by an expert body, so challenge cannot be allowed.
However, the Division Bench had consensus on the following aspects:
1. The Judicial Review of the decision taken by the bodies concerned in the matter of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) is permissible.
2. Central Government is directed to evolve a National Policy regarding GM crops in the realm of research, cultivation, trade and commerce. Such a policy shall be formulated in consultation with all stakeholders, experts in the field of agriculture, biotechnology, State Governments, representatives of the farmers, etc.
3. The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change shall conduct a national consultation, preferably within the next four months, with the aim of formulating the National Policy on GM crops. The State Governments shall be involved in evolving the National Policy on GM crops.
In the matter of importing GM food and more particularly GM edible oil, the respondent shall comply with the requirements of Section 23 of FSSA, 2006, which deals with packaging and labeling of foods.
Tags : GM Mustard Approval National Policy
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High Court of Delhi
Commissioner of Police and Anr. vs. Ravina Yadav and Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:5372-DB)
MANU/DE/4823/2024
22.07.2024
Service
Rule 43 CCS (Leave) Rules creates an unreasonable distinction between rights of first two children born to a lady government servant and the third or the subsequent child
The respondent no.1 is employed with the petitioners as a Lady Constable. From her first marriage, she was blessed with two children. After divorce by mutual consent, custody of both the children was handed over to her ex-husband. She re-married and from the second wedlock, she was blessed with a child on 08.06.2018. She submitted an application seeking maternity leave with effect from 08.06.2018. On being consulted by the petitioners, the Department of Personnel & Training (DoPT) rendered their opinion dated 12.03.2019 that according to Rule 43 of the CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972, a female government servant is entitled to maternity leave for a period of 180 day if she has less than two surviving children. Aggrieved by the order, respondent no. 1 approached the learned tribunal wherein directions were given to the petitioners to grant maternity leave to the respondent. Hence, the present petition has been filed.
The issue is whether a lady government servant, who has two surviving children, is or is not entitled to maternity leave in case of third or subsequent child as the principle of Rule 43 of CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972, is based on public policy and family planning goal of the Central Government?
The matter has to be examined with the lens of constitutional morality in the light of the Directive Principles of State Policy and other Articles enshrined in the Constitution of India. Not just motherhood, it is also the childhood that requires special attention. The health issues of both - mother as well as the child are to be kept in consideration while providing maternity leave, aimed at protecting the dignity of motherhood by providing for full and healthy maintenance of the woman and her child. The maternity leave is intended to achieve the object of ensuring social justice to women and children.
The Court further observed that the Rule 43 CCS(Leave) Rules creates an unreasonable distinction between rights of first two children born to a lady government servant and the third or the subsequent child, making the third and the subsequent child suffer deprivation of motherly care, which first two children had received. Thus, court is of prima facie view that classification of lady government servants on the basis of number of surviving children they have lacks intelligible differentia. However, the view is only prima facie view, because vires of Rule 43 were not challenged before the court.
Thus, no reason available to interfere with the humane and progressive view taken by the learned Tribunal, so the impugned order is upheld and the petition as well as the accompanying applications are dismissed, expecting that the government authorities would re-examine the sustainability of Rule 43 of the CCS(Leave) Rules.
Tags : Maternity leave CCS Rules Two-child policy
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High Court of Himachal Pradesh
Krishan Lal v Champa Devi (Neutral Citation: 2024:HHC:5582)
MANU/HP/1476/2024
22.07.2024
Family
Condition that a wife is not entitled to maintenance if she is living in adultery will apply, when the matrimonial relations subsist and not after the divorce
A divorce petition filed by the Petitioner-husband was allowed on the grounds of desertion, cruelty and adultery and a decree of divorce was granted on 26.02.2007. After the passing of decree of divorce, Judicial Magistrate First Class had passed an interim order of maintenance in favour of the wife awarding ₹1,000/- per month. The revision filed by Petitioner for assailing the order was dismissed. The wife filed an application under Section 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC) for enforcing the order dated 07.01.2009. The Petitioner filed an objection petition stating that the wife was living in adultery and she is not entitled to maintenance in view of Section 125(4). The learned trial court held that the interim order of maintenance was passed despite the decree of divorce. Hence, the Court is bound to execute the order unless it is varied or vacated. Hence, the present petition was filed by the husband. The issue involved in the case is that whether the divorced wife is entitled to maintenance if she is living in adultery?
The court cited a judgment pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohtash Singh vs. Ramendri and Ors., MANU/SC/0147/2000
wherein, it was held that a wife is not entitled to maintenance from her husband if she is living in adultery, she has refused to live with her husband or they are living separately by mutual consent. These conditions will apply when the matrimonial relations subsist and not after the divorce.
Thus, the court observed that, in view of the binding precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the plea that a divorced wife is not entitled to maintenance if she is living in adultery is not acceptable. The petition has been dismissed.
Tags : Maintenance Adultery Divorce
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State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Hero MotoCorp Ltd. and Another Vs. Rajender Singh
MANU/SL/0011/2024
22.07.2024
Consumer
Expert evidence is an essential requisite to prove inherent manufacturing defect
Complainant purchased Motorcycle (Splendor) from dealer on 17.03.2018. The motorcycle had issues from the very first day it was purchased. The complainant brought the motorcycle for minor repairs on 11.04.2018. After a while, the motorcycle went out of order again and was brought in for repairs. After several rounds of repairs, the dealer told the complainant that the Motorcycle has an inherent manufacturing defect. Therefore, the complainant pleading deficiency of services and unfair trade practice on the part of the company and the dealer filed the complaint in District Consumer Commission-Bhiwani.
District Consumer Commission-Bhiwani preceded the matter ex parte. They ordered appellants to replace old motorcycle of complainant, with new one along with compensation of Rs.5000/- on account of harassment and litigation expenses. Aggrieved by this appellant presented this present appeal. The issue raised in the present case is can repeated repairs be considered evidence of a manufacturing defect?
It was observed that inherent manufacturing defects are something more than ordinary defects. To support the claim of inherent defect, the report of an expert is an essential requirement. To establish a claim for total replacement by a new vehicle; a complainant must prove by cogent, credible and adequate evidence supported by the opinion of the experts like automobile/mechanical engineer that vehicle suffered from inherent manufacturing defect.
Therefore, the Commission rejected the complainant's claim regarding replacement of a new motorcycle in place of an old motorcycle as it does not carry any credence. But the compensation of Rs. 5000/- awarded to complainant was “just, appropriate and reasonable compensation” as the complainant suffered harassment and agony by knocking the doors of the dealer time and again at regular intervals.
Tags : expert report defects compensation
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