High Court of Madras

P.M. Elavarasan Vs. A. Sujatha and Ors.

MANU/TN/1338/2018

19.03.2018

Civil

Absence of any provision in Original Side Rules, which enables production of documents in cross-examination, cannot amount to prohibition against production of documents in cross-examination

Present application has been filed seeking the applicant/6th Defendant to strike out the deposition of D.W.1, recorded on 23rd January, 2017 and 19th June, 2017 and to strike out the Exhibits, as according to the applicant, the procedure adopted in recording the said evidence and in marking those documents is against the Rules of the Original Side of present Court and the questions put in cross-examination to the witness are per se defamatory. The question that, arises for consideration in instant application is as to whether Rule 8 of Order IX of the Original Side Rules, completely bars production of documents in cross-examination of witnesses by the adversary. The other prayer is sought for in this application is that the question, which are put to the witness in cross-examination on 19th June, 2017 are per se defamatory.

The Division Bench of this Court in Saradambal Ammal v. Sambanda Mudaliar, had held that, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which are inconsistent with the Original Side Rules of this Court will not apply to the proceedings in the Original Side of this Court. Section 137 of the Evidence Act, vests a right of cross-examination on the adverse party and such right cannot be reduced to be empty formality. In K.V. Kuppuswamy Ayyangar and another v. The State of Tamil Nadu, rep by its Chief Secretary, Madras and others, a Division Bench of this Court had held that, the power under order VI Rule 17, is available to this Court for allowing amendment of the pliant. The Division Bench after considering the scope of Rule 3 of Order I of the Original Side Rules, held that the High Court will have the power to amend the plaint, under Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC, de hors the absence of a provision in the Original Side Rules.

Section 144 of the Evidence Act, 1872 relates to evidence as to matters in writing and it enables question being put the witness under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not contained in a document, and for that purpose, it enables the document being produced, Section 145 of the Evidence Act, enables cross-examination of witness as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and if the witness is to be contradicted by the said writing. Section 145 requires the attention of the witnesses, must be drawn to the writing, before he/she could be questioned on the writings. Therefore, production of documents in cross-examination cannot be said to be totally barred, either by the Original Side Rules or the Rules contained in the CPC. These Rules being procedural in nature must give way to the substantive law, viz. The Evidence Act.

The mere fact that the Original Side Rules, does not enable production of documents in cross-examination of the witness, cannot be used as a tool to shut out Cross-examination of the witness on the contents of the documents as well as production of documents in cross-examination. The absence of any provision in the Original Side Rules, which enables production of documents in cross-examination, cannot amount to a prohibition against the production of documents in cross-examination. In fact, Order XLIX Rule 3 of the Code of CPC, itself enumerates the Rules in the CPC, which will not apply to the High Court exercising its ordinary original jurisdiction. Order VII Rule 14 of the CPC, does not form part of those Rules and its application is not excluded by Order XLIX Rule 3 of the CPC. Therefore, the provisions of Order VII Rule 14 Sub Rule 4 can always be made applicable to the proceedings in the original side of this Court. Any other interpretation would only be doing violence to the provisions of the substantive law, viz. The Indian Evidence Act. Therefore, the procedure adopted by the learned Additional Master, in allowing marking of Exs. P30, P31 and P32 in cross-examination of D.W.1 does not call for any interference and the documents cannot be struck off from evidence.

Section 138 of the Evidence Act, provides that cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief. Section 146 of the Evidence Act, provides that it shall be lawful for the cross-examining counsel, to put questions to discover who the witness is and what is its position in life or to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to criminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty of forfeiture. Therefore, it was definitely open to the counsel to ask the question regarding the character of the witnesses, while cross examining the witness and from the portion of the evidence extracted above, it could be seen the witness promptly denied the suggestion. Therefore, there is no need to strike out the evidence recorded on 19th June, 2017 as contended by the learned counsel claiming it to be per se defamatory. The application is dismissed.

Relevant

Saradambal Ammal vs. Sambanda MudaliarMANU/TN/0406/1962
; K.V. Kuppuswamy Ayyangar and Anr. vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Chief Secretary and Ors. MANU/TN/0528/1991

Tags : Cross-Examination Evidence Strike-out

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High Court of Punjab and Haryana

Piara Singh Vs. State of Punjab

MANU/PH/0205/2018

19.03.2018

Criminal

A conflict or contradiction between ocular and medical evidence has to be direct and material

The instant appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment/order passed by the trial Court in FIR registered under Sections 363-A, 376 of Indian Penal Code, 1960 (IPC) whereby, the Appellant has been convicted and sentence to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 3 years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000 under Section 363 of IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 10 years and to pay fine of Rs. 3000 under Section 376(2)(f) of IPC.

A reading of the complaint as well as statement of the witnesses goes to show that, the occurrence took place in the evening of 23rd October, 2007 at about 7.00 p.m., and immediately thereafter, the victim was admitted to the hospital and in the morning of next day i.e. 24th October, 2007, the matter was reported to the police. It was explained by the complainant (PW2) that, after the occurrence, they took the victim to their residence and after arranging some transport, they took the victim to civil hospital. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that, there is a delay in lodging of the FIR. After chemical examination report, PW7 has opined that, the possibility of an attempt to have sexual intercourse cannot be ruled out.

It is a settled principle of law that, a conflict or contradiction between the ocular and the medical evidence has to be direct and material and only then the same can be pleaded. The possibility of some variations in the exhibits, medical and ocular evidence cannot be ruled out. But it is not that, every minor variation or inconsistency would tilt the balance of justice in favour the accused. Of course, where contradictions and variations are of a serious nature, which apparently or impliedly are destructive of the substantive case sought to be proved by the prosecution, they may provide an advantage to the accused. Unless medical evidence in its term goes so far as to completely rule out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner stated by the eyewitnesses, the testimony of the eyewitnesses cannot be thrown out. In light of the settled canon of criminal jurisprudence, present Court does not find any merit in the contention raised on behalf of the Appellant with regard to discrepancy in the medical and the ocular evidence.

In the case, in hand there is a direct link of Appellant with the commission of the crime and such conclusion is well established by statement of the complainant, witnesses and medical/FSL report. Though penetration itself proves offence of rape, but contrary is not true i.e. even if there is no penetration, it does not necessarily mean that, there is no rape. Penetration may not always result in tearing of hymen and same will always depend upon facts and circumstances of a given case. There may be limited penetration due to which probably hymen of victim girl was not ruptured. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, presence of element of mens rea on the part of Appellant cannot be denied. Further, it is well settled that on the sole testimony of the victim, an accused can be convicted and there is no bar in the same, whereas, in the in instant case, the testimony of the victim has been corroborated by three other witnesses.

The victim and her sister being child witnesses, the trial Court, during the course of recording of their statements, put certain questions to them to assess their ability to understand to which they properly replied and were declared fit to make the statement. It is settled proposition of law that, testimonies of the relatives are equally credible as any other person. Further, during their cross-examination, nothing has come on record, which could point out that they were deposing falsely. More so, no such material discrepancies, which would lead this court to discard the testimony of the witnesses, has been pointed out in this case.

The Appellant has been, apart from Section 363 of IPC, has been convicted for the commission of offence under Section 376(2)(f) of IPC, which envisages that whoever commits rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may be for life and shall also be liable to fine. Meaning thereby, the Appellant-accused has been convicted for the minimum statutory period of ten years under that section. However, proviso attached that section provides that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment of either description for a term of less than ten years. In the present case, the Appellant-accused has been found guilty of committing rape of minor girl, who was aged about 05 years at the time of occurrence. In view of the age of the minor victim and other factors of the case, no adequate and special reasons are made out in instant case, to reduce the sentence of the appellant, to the period already undergone by him and this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is rejected. Present Court does not find any illegality or irregularity in the judgment passed by the trial court. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

Tags : Conviction Validity Evidence Credibility

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Central Information Commission

Pramod Kumar Singh Vs. CPIO, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar National Institute of Technology

MANU/CI/0229/2018

19.03.2018

Right to Information

A voluntary disclosure of all information that ought to be displayed in public domain should be the rule and members of public who having to seek information should be an exception

The Appellant vide his RTI application sought information regarding the inception date of Dr. B.R.A.- National Institute of Technology Jalandhar (formerly Dr. B.R.A.- Regional Engineering College Jalandhar), whether both the General Provident Fund (GPF) and Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) were available as an option to a new employee who joined before 1st January, 2004 and issues related thereto. The CPIO vide its letter furnished a point wise response to the Appellant. Dissatisfied by the response, the Appellant approached the FAA. The Appellant reiterated the contents of his RTI application and stated that, complete and satisfactory information had not been received by him. Furthermore, the First Appeal filed by him had also not been answered.

The Commission observed that, a voluntary disclosure of all information that ought to be displayed in the public domain should be the rule and members of public who having to seek information should be an exception. An open government, which is the cherished objective of the Right To Information Act, 2005, can be realised only if all public offices comply with proactive disclosure norms. Section 4(2) of the RTI Act mandates every public authority to provide as much information suo-motu to the public at regular intervals through various means of communications, including the Internet, so that the public need not resort to the use of RTI Act.

The Commission also observes the Delhi High Court ruling in Delhi Development Authority v. Central Information Commission and Another, wherein it was held that, the information should be easily accessible and to the extent possible should be in electronic format with the Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer, as the case may be. The word disseminate has also been defined in the explanation to mean-making the information known or communicating the information to the public through notice boards, newspapers, public announcements, media broadcasts, the internet, etc. It is, therefore, clear from a plain reading of Section 4 of the RTI Act that the information, which a public authority is obliged to publish under the said section should be made available to the public and specifically through the internet. There is no denying that, the Petitioner is duty bound by virtue of the provisions of Section 4 of the RTI Act to publish the information indicated in Section 4(1)(b) and 4(1)(c) on its website so that the public have minimum resort to the use of the RTI Act to obtain the information."

Similarly, the High Court of Bombay in Dr. Celsa Pinto, Ex-Officio Joint Secretary (School Education) vs. The Goa State Information Commission had held that as per Section 2(f), Information means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force; The definition cannot include within its fold answers to the question why which would be the same thing as asking the reason for a justification for a particular thing. The Public Information Authorities cannot expect to communicate to the citizen the reason why a certain thing was done or not done in the sense of a justification because the citizen makes a requisition about information. Justifications are matter within the domain of adjudicating authorities and cannot properly be classified as information."

In view of facts of the case and the submissions made by both the parties and considering the larger public interest involved in the matter, the Commission advises the Respondent to prepare FAQs in respect of the queries raised in the RTI application and other related issues and place the same on its website within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of this order. The Appeal disposed off accordingly.

Relevant

Dr. Celsa Pinto, Ex-Officio Joint Secretary (School Education) vs. The Goa State Information Commission (MANU/MH/0354/2008
: 2008 (110) Bom.L.R. 1238), Delhi Development Authority v. Central Information Commission and Another

Tags : Information Dissemination Website

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High Court of Himachal Pradesh

Gulshan Mohammad Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh

MANU/HP/0257/2018

17.03.2018

Criminal

Freedom of an individual cannot be curtailed merely on the basis of suspicion

Apprehending his arrest, bail Petitioner, has approached present Court by way of instant petition for grant of pre-arrest bail in FIR registered under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Bail Petitioner has been ordered to be enlarged on bail, sequel to order dated 6th March, 2018.

The Petitioner while making reference to the record/status report submitted that, no case under Section 376 IPC, is made out against the Pail petitioner. While inviting attention of this court to the complaint lodged by the complainant-prosecutrix, it is submitted that, there is no specific allegation in the complaint that she was compelled by the bail Petitioner to solemnize marriage and thereafter, to develop physical relations with the complainant, rather she of her own volition stayed with the bail Petitioner for more than six years and during this period, she never lodged any complaint either to the police station or gram panchayat. Investigation in the case is almost complete and nothing is required to be recovered from the bail Petitioner at this stage and as such, there is no occasion for the custodial interrogation of the bail Petitioner.

There is no evidence available at this stage suggestive of the fact that, the bail Petitioner taking undue advantage of innocence of the complainant, compelled her to solemnize the marriage with him, rather investigation reveals that, in the year, 2007, after the death of husband of the complainant, bail Petitioner approached her for marriage. Similarly, there is no allegation in the complaint that between year, 2007-2010, bail petitioner sexually assaulted the complainant against her wishes/volition, rather complainant, who at that relevant time was mother of two children herself decided to solemnize marriage with the bail petitioner. Otherwise also there is no explanation, if any, available on record with regard to the complainant's silence for almost six years between year, 2010 to 2016. Apart from above, if aforesaid allegation leveled by the complainant is presumed to be correct that bail petitioner mis-represented himself to be Hindu, there is no explanation that why bail petitioner kept mum for two years, after discovering the aforesaid fact in the year, 2016. Though aforesaid aspects of the matter are required to be considered and decided by the court below on the basis of material adduced on record by the prosecution, but this Court after having seen record sees no reason for custodial interrogation of the bail petitioner, who has otherwise made himself available for investigation.

Regarding another apprehension expressed by learned Additional Advocate General with regard to petitioner's absconding from trial in the event of his being enlarged on bail is concerned, same can be met by putting the bail petitioner to stringent conditions as has been fairly submitted by the learned counsel representing the bail petitioner.

Object of the bail is to secure the attendance of the accused in the trial and the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial. Otherwise, bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. Otherwise also, normal rule is of bail and not jail. Court has to keep in mind nature of accusations, nature of evidence in support thereof, severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused involved in that crime.

Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Dataram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., has categorically held that, freedom of an individual is of utmost importance and same cannot be curtailed merely on the basis of suspicion. Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that, till the time guilt of the accused is not proved in accordance with law, he is deemed to be innocent.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee and Another, has laid down the following principles to be kept in mind, while deciding petition for bail: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.

Order dated 6th March, 2018 passed by this Court, is made absolute, subject to the conditions that, he shall make himself available for the purpose of interrogation, if so required and regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application; He shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever; He shall not make any inducement, threat or promises to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer; and He shall not leave the territory of India without the prior permission of the Court. It is clarified that if the petitioner misuses his liberty or violates any of the conditions imposed upon him, the investigating agency shall be free to move this Court for cancellation of the bail. The bail petition stands disposed of accordingly.

Relevant

Dataram Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee and Another MANU/SC/0916/2010
: (2010) 14 SCC 496

Tags : FIR Pre-arrest bail Grant

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Supreme Court

Bimal Gurung and Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

MANU/SC/0259/2018

16.03.2018

Criminal

When a cognizable offence takes place before the eyes of police personnel, it is his obligation and duty to register a FIR

The Petitioner, the President of Gorkha Janmukti Morcha ("GJM"), has filed present Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India praying for transfer of investigation of all First Information Reports lodged against the Petitioner and other members of GJM, to any independent investigation agency. The issue is as to whether, as prayed by the Petitioner, investigation in such cases are required to be transferred to a central investigate agency.

The Constitution Bench of present Court in State of West Bengal has authoritatively laid down that, the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution and present Court under Article 32 of Constitution can issue direction to CBI to investigate a cognizable offence within the State without consent of that State. The Constitution Bench also in the above context has held that, although present Court has implied power and jurisdiction to direct for the transfer to CBI to investigate a cognizable offence but also has obligation to exercise the said power with great caution which must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations.

The Petitioner's prayer is to transfer the investigation of all the FIRs lodged against the Petitioner and other members of GJM. The offences alleged in the cases are serious offences including offences under Sections 121, 121A and 153A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and offences Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as well as offences under Sections 307 and 302 of IPC etc. Transfer of investigation of such large number of cases en masse is neither practicable nor justified. The jurisdiction under Article 226 and Article 32 with regard to transfer of investigation of cases has to be exercised on facts of each and every case. There are no grounds available in the aforesaid 112 cases so as this Court may exercise jurisdiction under Article 32 of Constitution for transfer of investigation in all cases.

In principle, when transfer of one case is permissible, number of cases may not be an impediment in transfer of more than one case. Even if only those cases are to be taken into consideration where Petitioner is named Accused, there are no such special grounds made out in the writ petition on which even those cases be considered for transferring the investigation.

The present case is a case where the Petitioner as Leader of GJM is a spare heading an agitation against the State demanding a separate State-hood. The State is obliged to maintain law and order and to protect live and property of the citizens. It has to take necessary steps to contain such agitation and restore the peace. The cases lodged in the FIR submitted at the instance of the Police or other complainants cannot be discarded on the specious pleas that they have been lodged due to bias of the State and with the intent to persecute the Petitioner. The "State" is a political unit vested with constitutional duties and obligations. The Governor of the State formally represent the State in whom the executive Power of the State is vested and exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with the Constitution of India.

The authorities and police officers, who are entrusted different obligations and functions under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has to act as ordained by the CrPC. It is an obligation of the police officers to register a First Information Report when they receive any information regarding commission of a cognizable offence. For recording such offences, they are neither required to await any instructions from any authority or State nor they have to abdicate their obligation to register F.I.R. as required by CrPC.

The Constitution Bench of this Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., has elaborately considered the obligation to register an F.I.R. when information of cognizable offence is received by a police personnel. Following are the relevant observations made by the Constitution Bench speaking through Justice P. Sathasivam that "When a cognizable offence takes place before the eyes of police personnel, he is not to await any information or any other source for registering a F.I.R., it is his obligation and duty to register a F.I.R.". Thus, F.I.R. registered at the instance of police leading serious offences involving Petitioner and supporters of GJM, cannot be discarded on the plea that it was police, who has roped in the Petitioner and other supporters by lodging the F.I.R. No bias or mala fide has been pleaded against any individual State functionary or police officer nor any such person has been impleaded in the writ petition so as to consider the allegation of bias. It is very easy to make allegations of bias against a person but it is difficult to substantiate the same. In the present case, neither there are any pleading nor any material to come to a conclusion that State functionaries including police functionaries are biased against the Petitioner. Thus, the allegations of the bias made against the State and police functionaries had to be rejected and Petitioner cannot be permitted in saying that the FIRs lodged against him are result of a bias of the State or police personnel.

Most of the cases which were cited s by the parties are the cases where this Court exercised jurisdiction under Article 32 of Constitution in transferring the investigation at the instance of the victims. For a victim the investigation in a case is of much significance. In the event, a proper investigation is not carried out and relevant evidence which would have been collected by due care and caution, is not collected, the victim is sure not to get justice on such faulty investigation. In case of faulty investigation, where an Accused has been wrongly roped in, he has right to seek all remedies before Court of Law for further investigation and a Court of Law is able to marshall all evidence and capable of discerning truth from evidence on record. Although as a principle, there is no fetter on an Accused to move a Court of Law for transfer of investigation, but on the facts of instant case, it is not a fit case where this Court may exercise jurisdiction under Article 32 to transfer the cases en masse to an independent agency. The present case cannot be said to be a case of individual's persecution by the State authority. The Petitioner is not entitled for any relief. The writ petition is dismissed.

Relevant

Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., MANU/SC/1166/2013
: (2014) 2 SCC 1

Tags : FIR Investigation Transfer

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High Court of Delhi

CMYK Printech Ltd. Vs. United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd.

MANU/DE/1064/2018

16.03.2018

Property

A juristic entity can ratify the acts done on its behalf expressly or impliedly

Instant appeal is the outcome of the order passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the applications filed by the Appellant-the Defendant in the original case seeking setting aside of the order disposing of the suit on the compromise/settlement arrived at during mediation and the consequential reliefs. In the subject application, the Appellant sought to feign ignorance of the suit proceedings itself while taking the plea of the revocation of the authority of Sh. O.P. Gupta to represent it and act on its behalf in view of the Board Resolution dated 2nd September, 2008. Ld. Single Judge has elaborately dealt with this plea as well to reach the conclusion that, the Appellant was not only aware of the institution of the suit proceedings but even its C.O.O. Mr. Abhishek Saxena was throughout kept informed of the talks of settlement taking place through the chambers of the Advocates of the parties via diverse e-mails.

There is no specific denial of the fact by the Appellant that, a settlement was arrived at amongst the parties. The issuance of the e-mails as referred to in para 'X' of the application filed by the Respondent under Section 340 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) necessarily leads to the conclusion that, e-mails exchanged amongst the parties were equally in relation to the settlement dated 11th November, 2016 only and it was to the very knowledge of Sh. Chandan Mitra, Chairman and Managing Director of the appellant, as well. The subject application and now the appeal primarily and predominantly proceed on the premise that, Sh. O.P. Gupta was not authorized to either contest the suit or arrive at the settlement. The memorandum and the grounds of appeal are equally silent and do not even impliedly dispute the correctness of the observations made by the ld. Single Judge that Sh. O.P. Gupta has been representing the Appellant in Arbitration Pet. No. 22/2013 and Ex. Pet. No. 154/2015 on the strength of the Board Resolution dated 29th September, 2001 only.

In the given factual conspectus, in the event the Board Resolution dated 29th September, 2001 stood revoked by the Resolution dated 2nd September, 2008, there is no explanation as to how said Sh. O.P. Gupta continued to represent and act on behalf of the Appellant in the said proceedings even after the revocation of his authority in September, 2008. It necessarily implies that, the purported Board Resolution dated 2nd September, 2008 even though passed by the Board of Directors, was never sought to be given effect to either by the Board or any of its Directors. More so, when Sh. O.P. Gupta, Manager(HR) has continued to represent and act on behalf of the appellant in all the proceedings including in the subject case to the knowledge of all concerned officers of the appellant even after the passing of the purported Resolution dated 2nd September, 2008, it shows thereby that the appellant had also ratified all the acts of Sh. O.P. Gupta by necessary implication. The principle that a juristic entity can ratify the acts done on its behalf expressly or impliedly, is well recognized through the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar & Ors.

The submission that, the subject application came to be disposed of without affording an opportunity to the applicant to file document(s) and lead evidence to prove its case, is wholly meritless in the present case. The subject application has come to be disposed of on the facts which are not disputed or did not require any formal proof thereof. There is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed.

Relevant

United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar & Ors., MANU/SC/0002/1997
: (1996) 6 SCC 660

Tags : Juristic entity Settlement Validity

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