6 November 2017


High Court of Jammu and Kashmir

Divisional Forest Officer, Doda Vs. Zia Ul Rasheed




Once Session judge has found that order of authority is not accordance with law, then that order cannot be quashed

In the instant petition, the Petitioner has assailed the validity of the order passed by Additional Sessions Judge, whereby the order passed by Petitioner in his capacity as an Authorised Officer, was quashed. A vehicle (TATA SUMO) of which the Respondent is a registered owner, was seized by the police; the vehicle was involved in smuggling the Nag Chatri (Trilium Govanianum), a banned Minor Forest Produce (MFP); the total quantity of the Minor Forest Produce was to the extent of 175 Kgs. Petitioner concluded that, the vehicle was involved in smuggling of the NAG CHATRI and as such vide order, vehicle along with MFP was confiscated. Issues involved in present case is whether the Sessions Judge can set aside an order under Section 435 of the CrPC without making a reference to High Court under Section 438 of the CrPC and that whether the Sessions Judge can re-appreciate the facts under Section 26-B of the Forest Act when owner of the vehicle to whom the notices regarding confiscation of the vehicle has failed to satisfy the authority that the vehicle has been used without his knowledge and connivance as amended in terms of sub-clause 5 of Section 26 of the Forest Act.

Vide Amendment Act of 2006, Section 438 of CrPC has been amended and old Section has been substituted by Act XI of 2006, which provides that, in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by him, the Sessions Judge may exercise all or any of the powers which may be exercised by the High Court under sub-section(1) of Section 439. Where any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a Sessions Judge under sub-Section(1) the provisions of sub-Sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 439 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceedings and references in the said sub-Sections to the High Court shall be construed as references to the Sessions Judge. Where any application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge, the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in relation to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other court. An Additional Sessions Judge shall have and may exercise all the powers of a Sessions Judge under this Chapter in respect of any case which may be transferred to him by or under any general or special order of the Sessions Judge." In view above substituted Section, there is now no need of reference to be made by Session Judge while setting aside order of subordinate authority in exercising the revisional power.

Under the Forest Act, Sessions Judge shall, as far as may be, exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as it exercises and follows while entertaining, hearing and deciding a revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, Samvat 1989. In present case, Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Doda has held that, as per Section 26(3) of Forest Act, the authorised officer has power to confiscate the forest products along with vehicle; but Section 26(5) of Act prohibits the officer to confiscate the vehicle used for commission of offence under this Act, if it is proved by owner that vehicle was used without his knowledge. The satisfaction of officer should be based upon defence taken by owner after providing him opportunity of being heard.

So called statement recorded nowhere discloses that, it was recorded on oath in the presence of authorized officer or in presence of the counsel for the Petitioner. These statements including the statements of other accused persons are not even signed by the authorized officer nor there is any material on record to disclose that these statements were recorded either by or in presence of the authorized officer in accordance with law. The minutes of the proceedings recorded by the authorized officer only show the presence/absence of the parties on certain dates of hearing without disclosing as to when these statements were recorded. The authorized officer has not even taken pains to procure the presence of complainant before it to record his statement to verify the allegations levelled against the Petitioner and other accused persons.

It is true that, when confiscation proceeding are pending, Criminal Court cannot release the vehicle. However, once a confiscation proceeding has been completed and vehicle is ordered to be confiscated, then order is revisable in terms of Section 26-B of Forest Act. The purpose of revision is to enable the revision Court to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and as to the regularity of any proceedings of the inferior criminal Court. Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding in terms of Section 26-B of Act for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of order of authority under forest Act. It is a kind of supervisory jurisdiction in order to prevent miscarriage of justice arising from the mis-conception of law or irregularity of procedure committed by any subordinate authority. In the Forest Act, revision power has been given to Session Judge on the analogy that, being senior and being head of subordinate judiciary, would have sufficient knowledge to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, committed by subordinate officer, which may affect substantial right of any parties.

This Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 561-A of Cr.P.C., can only quash the order of a Court below to prevent abuse of process of law or to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Court while exercising the power under Section 561-A of Cr.P.C., does not function as Court of trial, appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction has to be exercised sparingly, careful and with great caution. Once Session judge has found that, order of authority is not accordance with law, then that order cannot be quashed. Order of Court below does not suffer from any infirmities of laws and facts. Petition is dismissed.

Tags : Proceedings Legality Supervisory jurisdiction

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Supreme Court

Bijender and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Ors.



Land Acquisition

Belting system is applicable when large pieces of land having different locations are acquired for determining market value

The landowners filed Reference Petitions under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 before the Additional District Judge, praying for enhancement of the compensation contending that, the market value of the land at the time of acquisition was much higher than what was offered by the Collector in his Awards. According to the Appellants (landowners), the market value was to the tune of Rs. 5000/- per sq. yds. The Additional District Judge by its common Award dismissed all reference petitions and, in consequence, upheld the Awards passed by the Collector. The Reference Court was of the view that, the rate at which the compensation was determined by the Collector by applying the Belting System in working out the compensation was just and proper and as per Section 23 of the Act. The Reference Court, therefore, did not enhance the compensation awarded by the Collector. All the reference petitions were accordingly dismissed.

Aggrieved by the said Awards, the landowners filed separate Regular First Appeals before the High Court praying for enhancement of the compensation. The High Court while disposing of the said appeals partly allowed the appeals. Issue raised in instant appeal is whether the Courts below were justified in applying the "Belting System" for determining the market rates of the acquired land in question and that whether the highest rate of Rs. 4500/- per square yard of the land of the nearby area out of 59 sale deeds should be made basis for determining the market rate of the acquired land.

The acquired land having a frontage abutting the highway/main road always has a better value as compared to the land, which is away from the highway/main road. Indeed, farther the land from the highway/main road, lesser the value of such land. In such a situation, where large pieces of land having different locations are acquired, Belting System is considered apposite for determining the market value of the lands. In Belting System, the acquired land is usually divided in two or three belts depending upon the facts of each case. The market value of the front belt abutting the main road is taken to fetch maximum value whereas the second belt fetches two third or so of the rate determined in relation to the first belt and the third belt, if considered proper to carve out, fetches half or so of the maximum. It is again depending upon facts of each case. Similarly, this Court has consistently held on the question as to what is fair and reasonable market value of any acquired land on the date of its acquisition. It is held that, such a question is always a question of fact and its answer depends on the nature of evidence, circumstances and probabilities appearing in each case.

The acquired land having a frontage abutting the highway/main road always has a better value as compared to the land, which is away from the highway/main road. Indeed, farther the land from the highway/main road, lesser the value of such land. In such a situation, where large pieces of land having different locations are acquired, Belting System is considered apposite for determining the market value of the lands. Collector was justified in applying the Belting System to the acquired land in question. Since the acquired land was a large chunk of land having its frontage abutting the roadside, the Belting System was rightly applied to the acquired land for determination of its fair market rate. The Appellants too did not raise any objection before the Collector and before the High Court and nor they were able to point out as to why it was not possible to apply the Belting System and what was illegal in its application.

The area sold in each sale deed is very small as compared to the acquired land. The lands which were sold by sale deeds is in square yards and ranges from 31.06 square yards to 440 yards whereas the acquired area in question is in acres and comprises of more than 300 acres. Out of 59 sale deeds, there are as many as 31 sale deeds wherein the area comprises of less than 100 square yards. Except two sale deeds where 60 and 67 square yard of land was sold for Rs. 4,500/- per square yard, all other sale deeds value ranges between Rs. 200/- to Rs. 2000/- per square yard. There can be no comparison between the two lands due to the extent of area which are two extremes and lastly, since no sale deeds were filed by the Appellants showing market price of any large chunk of land sold in acres at the relevant time, it is not possible to place reliance on any of these sale deeds for determining the market rate of the acquired land by applying the same rate.

In view of relevant factors emerging from the evidence and the findings of the Courts below on the issues such as-the location of the acquired land, its surroundings, nature, potentiality, rates of small plots, the purpose of acquisition, development cost needed, non availability of the sale deeds for large areas sold in acres, etc., present Court is of the opinion that just, fair and proper market value of the acquired land in question on the date of issuance of Section 4 notification is determined at Rs. 45,00,000/- for the lands described in detail in column 2 of the Award of the Collector and Rs. 35,00,000/- per acre for lands described in detail in column 1 of the said Award. The Appellants are held entitled to receive compensation for the acquired land. The Appellants are also held entitled to statutory compensation as provided in the Act and which the Courts below had already awarded to the Appellants. The impugned judgments are partially modified in Appellants' favour by enhancing the compensation payable to Appellants (claimants/landowners) in respect of their acquired land.

Tags : Acquisition Compensation Enhancement

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Central Administrative Tribunal

C.S. Malik Vs. Council of Scientific & Industrial Research and Ors.




Issuance of Charge Memorandum is enough, actual service of same on the delinquent officer is immaterial

The Applicant, a retired Senior Deputy Financial Advisor of the 1st Respondent-Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), filed the Original Application (OA) questioning the Charge Memorandum. Impugned Charge Memorandum contains Article of Charge that, Applicant, while functioning in the year 2010 at CSIR Headquarters, New Delhi committed misconduct as, he, in the matter of payments to QHFs-Quick Hire Fellows in respect of NISTADS, New Delhi, by his irregular and violative recommendation for making payments to QHFs from P-01 sub-head, from which salary is paid to scientists, led to the accordance of approval by the Financial Adviser and thereby perpetuated the payments made to the tune of over Rs. 1.0 crore to QHFs in NISTADS, although no such power was delegated to the officer under the existing rules. By his aforesaid acts of omission and commission, Applicant exhibited lack of absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner unbecoming to a Council servant contravening the Rule 3(1)(i), (ii) and (iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

It is the settled principle of law that, it is enough if the Charge Memorandum is issued before the required date and the actual service of the same on the delinquent officer is immaterial. Loss of opportunity to appeal cannot vitiate the Charge Memorandum issued by the appellate authority in every case. In the circumstances of the present case, i.e., where the charges are common and levelled against the Director, NISTADS and also the officers of CSIR, Headquarters, there is no illegality in issuing the impugned Charge Memorandum by the Vice President, who is the appellate authority.

The Respondents proceeded against the Applicant, in haste and in violation of the principles of natural justice and discriminately, may be in view of his impending superannuation. Admittedly, though the then Hon'ble Minister, directed to initiate major penalty proceedings against the then Director, NISTADS and others, way back on 15th May, 2014, till date, no chargesheet was issued to any other officer, except to the Applicant, that too on the date of his superannuation, hastily, and in violation of principles of natural justice. In case of all others, the Respondents have issued show cause notices and provided them opportunity to submit their representations and consulted the CVC at various stages. But in case of Applicant, no such procedure followed. When the Respondents are empowered to proceed against the Applicant, even after his retirement, if circumstances warrant, under the provisions of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, the hasty action against him, in issuing the charge memorandum under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, without giving him the same opportunity of show cause on par with other officers, is unjustified and unsustainable.

The OA is allowed and the impugned charge memorandum is quashed, with all consequential benefits. The Respondents shall release all the retirement benefits of the Applicant within 90 days from the date of receipt of present order.

Tags : Charge Memorandum Natural justice Violation

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High Court of Delhi

Rakesh Jagmohan Pandey Vs. JVG Finance Ltd.




A transfer would not be annulled, if the same is made in the ordinary course of business or in good faith and for valuable consideration

Present appeal is against the notice of the Official Liquidator and against the report of the One Man Committee constituted by this Court. It is only on the basis of the report of the One Man Committee, the Official Liquidator had demanded the vacant possession of two flats. The Appellant alleged to be a bona fide purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration and claims to be a registered owner of the flats. The Appellant claims to be in possession of the flats since 20th April, 1998 pursuant to two separate agreements to sell dated 13th April, 1998. The One Man Committee had rejected the claim of the applicants observing that, Respondent Company was prohibited per prohibitory order dated 10th October, 1997 from selling, transferring, creating charge or mortgaging or dealing in any manner with its property and assets without prior written permission of the bank.

The One Man Committee completely ignored that such a prohibitory order was valid only for a period of six months from the date it was issued. These flats were purchased by the Appellant after six months have elapsed. Admittedly, the prohibitory order was never extended, hence would not have any effect upon the legality of sale of these flats. Thus, the finding of One Man Committee viz., the sale being hit by Section 45MB of Reserve Bank Of India Act, 1934 is wholly incorrect. Alternatively, even if the sale was in contravention of prohibitory orders, then it simply could have entailed a penalty or imprisonment to the company's officials which could have been extended to three years or fine. The sale was not in contravention of Section 45MB of the Act.

Section 531A of Act, needs to be interpreted in the following manner: a) first one may examine if sale is made within a year of presentation of winding up petition; then b) then if the sale is in the ordinary course of business of the company and then c) if it is in favour of purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration.

Section 531A of Act, rather saves the transaction if entered into in good faith and for valuable consideration, even if not entered in ordinary course of its business. Further, though the One Man Committee held the sale being not for valuable consideration as the appellant failed to prove the payment of balance amounts of Rs. 5.50 Lac for flat No. 402 and of Rs. 8.00 Lac for flat No. 502, but the committee ignored the verification being conducted by the office of Official Liquidator by visiting the concerned authorities and even from the Sub Registrar's Office where such agreement to sell(s) were duly registered and the entire valuation checked and paid was noted. Registration certificate(s) were executed within ten days of the agreements to sell for both the flats, as stipulated in such agreements. Hence, there was no reason for the One Man Committee to say the entire consideration was never paid. Admittedly, the Respondent Company did not challenge alleged inadequate consideration in any forum, including before the Official Liquidator. Rather it never denied the receipt of entire consideration from the appellant.

Further, the apprehension of One Man Committee viz., such flats being undervalued also appear to be misconceived since, the record of Sub Registrar's Office revealed that, property was inspected and its valuation was based on Roads (Amendment) Act, 1998 and the entire stamp duty was paid per its valuation.

Thus, where the Appellant did not have knowledge of the prohibitory orders or of the company going in liquidation in the ensuing months; where the Appellant acted honestly and did not share common intention to defraud the creditors; where due diligence/verification was done by the employees of Official Liquidator; where Official Liquidator failed to prove the Appellant did not act in good faith; and where the sale being for valuation consideration; the intention of the Appellant cannot be doubted with and hence, in the circumstances, the sale transactions for flats are neither hit by Section 45MB of the Reserve Bank of India Act nor by Section 531A of the Companies Act, 1956, as alleged. Hence, the appeal is allowed and report of One Man Committee as also the order/notice of the Official Liquidator is set aside.

Tags : Prohibitory orders Knowledge Report Validity

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Central Administrative Tribunal

B.P. Maity and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors.




Organization has a right to change/re-change the promotion policy, adjust/readjust it according to the compulsions of the prevailing circumstances

The Applicants are working in RITES Ltd.-Respondent organization against the posts of Deputy General Manager (DGM) and Senior Deputy General Manager (Sr. DGM). The employees of RITES are having two types of pay scales, namely, the Central DA (CDA pay scales) and Industrial DA (IDA pay scales). As per the promotion policy of 2003, the next promotional post for officers working as DGM used to be Joint General Manager (JGM). The Respondents vide letter dated 22nd September, 2008 modified the said promotion policy and introduced an intermediary grade of Senior DGM in between DGM and JGM for which IDA pay scale of Rs. 16000-20800 was prescribed but no such CDA pay scale was prescribed. The Respondents issued an office order dated 15th June, 2009 (Annexure A-1) clarifying that, an employees of RITES who was not willing to move to IDA scales on promotion would only be re-designated by retaining his/her existing CDA scale on promotion, on giving written undertaking for such acceptance. The Annexure A-1 office order was followed by Annexure A-2 office order wherein it was stated that, in terms of Department of Public Enterprises (DPE) OM dated 10th August, 2009, it has been settled that henceforth, all appointments on promotion in RITES shall be in IDA scales only.

Thereafter, the Respondents sent Annexure A-3 communication to some of the senior DGMs, few of them are Applicants in present Original Application (OA), stating therein, that the office order dated 30th September, 2009 (Annexure A-2) holds 'good' and all appointments on promotion in RITES shall be made in IDA scales only. Aggrieved by Annexures A-1, A-2 orders and A-3 communication, the Applicants have filed the present OA, praying that Tribunal may direct the Respondents that in the event of promotion of the Applicants, they will fix their salary in the next higher CDA pay scale and thereafter the applicants will exercise the option for switching over to IDA pay scale on voluntary basis and quash impugned orders.

It is settled position of law that, the Respondent-organization has a right to change/re-change the promotion policy, adjust/readjust it according to the compulsions of the prevailing circumstances. Granting of pay scales and allowances is an exclusive executive function and this position has been upheld by the Apex Court in the case of P.U. Joshi & Others v. Accountant General, Hyderabad and Others.

The DPE is the nodal agency of the Central Government who formulates policy guidelines for CPSEs in the matters of pay & allowances and remunerations for their employees. The DPE vide its OM dated 12th June, 1990 had clearly directed the CPSEs that all appointments made on or after 1st January, 1989 in respect of all categories of employees by the CPSEs would be deemed to have been governed in IDA pay scales only. This O.M. was issued by the DPE in pursuance of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jute Corporation Officers' Association and others v. Jute Corporation of India Ltd., in which certain directions were issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

The directions relevant for present case are "(i) the scales of pay and dearness allowance as recommended in the Report will be extended to those employees who have been appointed with specific terms and conditions for grant of Central D.A. This will be equally applicable to the employees who by rules laid down by the public sector enterprises are being paid Central dearness allowance. (ii) The employees appointed on or after January 1, 1989, will be governed by such pay-scales and allowances as may be decided by the Government in its discretion. Those appointed earlier 1010 with IDA pattern will continue to be governed in accordance with the terms and conditions of their appointment. (iii) The pay revision for those employees in respect of whom the recommendations are hereby being directed to be implemented hereafter, will take place only as and when similar changes are effected for the Central Government employees. These employees will, however, continue to enjoy the option to switch over to the IDA pattern of the scales of pay etc. on a voluntary basis."

The word 'appointment' in the judgment of the Apex Court cannot be interpreted in a narrow sense. The DoP & T and Ministry of Legal Affairs have correctly interpreted that, appointments shall also include promotion as well. The Apex Court in Dr. Harikishan Singh v. State of Punjab has clearly held that, the word 'appointment' cannot mean only promotion, and it means appointment both by promotion and direct recruitment. Hence, the narrow interpretation of this word by the Applicants with reference to the DPE's OM dated 12th June, 1990 that only the appointees in CPSEs on or after 1st January, 1989 would be deemed to have been governed in the IDA pay scales is not correct. As a matter of fact, all promotions made on or after 1st January, 1989 will also be governed in terms of the DPEs OM dated 12th June, 1990 even in respect of the employees who were appointed prior to 1st January, 1989.

It is well understood that, purpose of introduction of IDA pay scale in CPSEs was to incentivise the employees of the CPSEs for better performance so that they could meet the challenges emerging from the private sectors. Continuation of CDA & IDA pay scales for all time to come in the CPSEs would not have been in their interest. Furthermore, the DPE's OM dated 12thJune, 1990 is, in fact, in compliance of the order of the Apex Court in Jute Corporation Officers' Association and others. It is reiterated that, appointment includes promotion as held by the Apex Court in Dr. Harikishan Singh v. State of Punjab. There is no merit in present application, accordingly it is dismissed.


P.U. Joshi & Others v. Accountant General, Hyderabad and Others, Dr. Harikishan Singh v. State of Punjab, Jute Corporation Officers' Association and others v. Jute Corporation of India Ltd.

Tags : Promotion policy Rules Validity

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High Court of Orissa

Bhagaban Khatua and Ors. Vs. State of Orissa and Ors.




The service of notice under Section 80 of CPC is a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer.

Present is a Plaintiffs' appeal against affirming judgment. Trial Court held that, no prior notice under Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) had been issued to Defendant Nos. 1 to 8. The mandatory provisions of Section 80 of CPC and Section 138 of the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act, 1964 ("O.G.P. Act") had not been complied with. The Plaintiffs failed to prove that, they had got exclusive right to ferry in Baideswar ghat. Unsuccessful Plaintiffs challenged the judgment and decree of the trial Court before the Additional District Judge, which was eventually dismissed.

Section 80 of CPC, imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the Court and in the absence of compliance with Section 80 of CPC, the suit is not maintainable. The service of notice under Section 80 of CPC is, a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer. The service of notice under sub-section (1) of Section 80 of CPC is imperative except where urgent and immediate relief is to be granted by the Court, in which case a suit against the Government or a public officer may be instituted, but with the leave of the Court. Leave of the Court is a condition precedent. Such leave must precede the institution of a suit without serving notice. Even though Section 80(2) of CPC, does not specify how the leave is to be sought for or given yet the order granting leave must indicate the ground(s) pleaded and application of mind thereon. A restriction on the exercise of power by the Court has been imposed, namely, the Court cannot grant relief, whether interim or otherwise, except after giving the Government or a public officer a reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of relief prayed for in the suit. Section 80 of CPC prescribes that, the plaint itself would mention that the notice was served. When from the perusal of the plaint it appears that, there is contravention of Section 80 of CPC by non-mention in the plaint that a notice had been served, the plaint should be rejected in limine without issuing summons to the defendants to appear. Admittedly, no notice under Section 80 of CPC was issued to the Defendant Nos. 1 to 6 before institution of the suit. Due to non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 80 of CPC, the suit was not maintainable.

Sub-section 1 of Section 138 of the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, provides that no suit or other legal proceedings shall be instituted against a Grama Sasan or a Grama Panchayat or against member, Sarpanch, Naib-Sarpanch, officer or other employee of the Grama Panchayat or against any person acting under its or his direction for anything done or purporting to have been done under this Act, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been, in the case of Grama Sasan or Grama Panchayat, delivered in or left at the office of the Panchayat and in the case of a member, officer or servant or any person acting under his direction or the direction of the Grama Panchayat, delivered to him or left at his office or place of residence, explicitly stating the cause of action, the nature of the reliefs sought, the amount of compensation, if any, claimed and the name and place of residence of the intending plaintiff; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. Sub-section (3) provides that, no suit or other legal proceeding referred to in Sub-section (1) shall be instituted after the expiry of a period of six months from the date of the accrual of the alleged cause of action. The aforesaid provision is mandatory in nature.

After promulgation of Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1951 ("OEA Act"), the estate vested in the State. Section 5 of the OEA Act, provides for consequences of vesting of an estate in the State. It provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract, on the publication of the notification in the Gazette under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 or Sub-section (1) of Section 3A or from the date of the execution of the agreement under Section 4 as the case may be the consequences enumerated in clause (a) shall ensue. Clause (a) provides that, subject to the subsequent provisions of the said Chapter the entire estate including all communal lands and porambokes, other non-raiyati lands, waste lands, trees, orchards, pasture lands, forests, mines and minerals (whether discovered or undiscovered, or whether being worked or not inclusive of rights in respect of any lease of mines and minerals) quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and other irrigation works, water channels, fisheries, ferries, hats and bazaars, and building or structures together with the land on which they stand shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances and such intermediary shall cease to have any interest in such estate other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of this Act.

It is clear that, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, the consequences enumerated in clause (a) shall ensue. Ferries have been mentioned in clause (a). Thus, ferries vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Section 5 of Act, contains a non-obstante clause. The same has the overriding effect of the Bengal Ferries Act, 1885. Thus, reliance placed on Bengal Ferries Act is misplaced. The appeal is dismissed.

Tags : Notice Service Right to ferry

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