Judgments
High Court of Madras
T. Devendiran v. State
24.06.2016
Criminal
Hitting with a gun not the same as shooting with one
The Madras High Court deleted a charge under Section 25 of the Arms Act against an accused who attacked the complainant physically with a gun.
Instead of shooting the complainant, the accused had bashed him on the head with the butt of the gun. No shots were fired in the altercation. Section 25 of the Act is a provision making punishable a wide variety of gun-related activities, including: converting imitation firearms into operational weapons; or indulges in the sale and manufacture of ammunition.
The court noted that the the accused was licensed to own the gun and only caused a “simple injury”, not a gunshot wound. As such, the matter was outside the remit of Section 25 of the Arms Act.
Tags : arms act assault simple injury
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Competition Commission of India
Kailash Chander Sharma v Coal India Limited and ors.
14.07.2016
MRTP/ Competition Laws
Coal India free to exercise ‘consumer choice’ in tender
The Competition Commission of India dismissed a complaint alleging abuse of market position against Coal India Limited, holding that Coal India had ‘consumer choice’ and was free to choose between competing products and services.
The complaint was received from an entity empanelled with CIL for providing technical and scientific services with regard to coal samples. It alleged that by changing its tender requirements for bidders for scientific and technical services in collection, preparation and transportation of coal samples, Coal India had shown preference for certain bidders over others, and being the dominant entity in the field it was abusing its market position.
Coal India’s initial tender for the services had limited bidders to those with an annual turnover of Rs. 25 crores - while the revised requirements reduced it to Rs. 20 crores and specified that prospective budders would have to submit a certificate of solvency and deposit Rs. 1 crore with the tender document. It was alleged that the Ministry of Coal and Power had not instructed Coal India to include such onerous conditions.
The Commission rejected the complaint noting that no barriers to entry had been created by the pre-qualification conditions, and the lowered turnover requirement did not bar Indian firms. The requirement of pre-deposit with tender documents could also not be called abusive. It reiterated, “a consumer of services must be allowed to exercise its consumer choice and freely select between competing products or services.” The Commission, however, remained silent on the potential incongruence between tender requirements set by Coal India and those prescribed by the coal ministry.
Tags : coal india tender scientific samples consumer freedom to choose
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Supreme Court
R.R. Parekh v. High Court of Gujarat and Ors.
MANU/SC/0767/2016
12.07.2016
Miscellaneous
Conduct of judicial officer can be used to conclude charge of misconduct
The Supreme Court upheld a 2012 judgment of the Gujarat high court that confirmed charges against the Appellant-Civil Judicial Magistrate at Bhuj in his improper trial of two criminal cases pertaining to offences under the Customs Act 1962 and the Imports & Exports (Control) Act 1947. In those cases, though appellant had convicted the accused, he had awarded a sentence of imprisonment less than the minimum prescribed and all the accused were granted a set-off.
It cautioned that direct evidence of corruption would not always be forthcoming in such a case of misconduct, and it was for the disciplinary authority to determine if a pattern interference emerged implicating the judicial officer - deeming the approach “robust common sense”.
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The ongoing investigation into the “oblique” motives of the Appellant did not deter the court from inferring deliberate malaise. It noted the enormous quantity of contraband articles in the original customs case: 275 silver slabs worth nearly Rs. 6 crore. The appellant was an experienced adjudicator and could not be found “unmindful” and unaware of the sentencing provisions in such a serious crime - particularly over two sittings. Moreover, the less-than-appropriate sentences were imposed in a manner which would not require the accused to remain in jail beyond judgment. It concluded that such a course of action was sufficient to prove a charge of misconduct against the appellant.
Nevertheless, it reduced the punishment - from one of dismissal - to compulsory retirement, given that the appellant had reached the age of superannuation.
Tags : judicial officer misconduct sentencing customs
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High Court of Delhi
Cepco Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Narinder Pal Singh Chawla
MANU/DE/1590/2016
11.07.2016
Tenancy
Mixed residential, commercial use envisaged in Delhi rent control
Section 2(l)(iii) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 is applicable in a case where tenancy premises are residential-cum-professional, or vice versa, and the nature of the tenanted premises is primarily residential and no part is purely commercial, the Delhi High Court held.
In the instant case, the Appellant had granted residential tenancy to the deceased. Subsequently, it was discovered that the deceased was using the property in a commercial capacity as well. After his death, deceased’s wife inherited limited tenancy rights in respect of the property.
The court considering precedent in Gian Devi noted that since the dispute involved mixed residential and commercial use, it was not dealt with by the earlier case - which only looked at application of Section 2(1)(iii) of the Act from a commercial perspective. In present appeal, premises was adjudged to be used residentially, serving also a professional purpose - thus not excluding it from the remit of the Act.
Relevant
Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar MANU/SC/0381/1985
Kamla Devi v. Satya P. Goel MANU/DE/0388/1986
Tags : rent control inherited rights residential commercial use
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National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Crompton Greaves Limited and Ors. v. Daimler Chrysler India Private Limited and Ors.
MANU/CF/0209/2016
08.07.2016
Consumer
Vehicles purchased by company for officers’ personal use not excluded from consumer protection law
The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission held that vehicles purchased by a company for its directors for their personal use are not excluded from protections under the Consumer Protection Act 1986.
The NCDRC had received the query: “whether the purchase of a car or any other goods by a company for the use/personal use of its Director amounts to purchase for a commercial purpose, within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act”.
The Appellant, Crompton Greaves, had purchased two Daimler (Mercedes) cars for use by its directors, but defects were found and a complaint was registered before the Commission. Daimler claimed that since the cars were purchased for a commercial purpose, the Consumer Protection Act was inapplicable.
The Commission looked to the definition of ‘consumer’ under the Act and noted that emphasis was on the purpose for which goods were obtained and would be put to use for. It opined, “If a car or other goods are purchased or the services are hired or availed by a company for the personal use of its directors or employees, the purpose behind such acquisition is not to earn profits or to advance the business activities of the company.”
Occasional and incidental use of the cars by the directors or employees of the company for the purposes of company business would not lead to a conclusion that the same were purchased for a commercial purpose.
Relevant
Controls and Switchgear Company Ltd. v. Daimler Chrysler India Pvt. Ltd. and T and T Motors Ltd. MANU/CF/0188/2007
Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute MANU/SC/0271/1995
Tags : consumer protection vehicles comercial use directors
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High Court of Chhattisgarh
Gulab Chand Jain and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh and Ors.
MANU/CG/0103/2016
08.07.2016
Arbitration
Arbitration tribunal empowered to recall order ‘in the interest of justice’
An arbitration tribunal can exercise its inherent powers to “secure the ends of justice”, the Chhattisdarh High Court said, allowing claims that the tribunal should have reviewed its earlier order instead of suggesting challenge before court.
Previously, the arbitration tribunal had dismissed reference petitions for want of jurisdiction and had held that an order passed by the tribunal would not become bad in law if soon after the law was changed.
The court reiterated the difference between “review” and “recall”, with the former permitting alteration or review of the judgment. Under Section 17A of the Chhattisgarh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 the tribunal was barred only from reviewing the award. The court concluded, “arbitration tribunal is unjustified in rejecting the application for recall of its earlier order…ought to have been allowed in the ends of justice and in the interest of justice.”
Relevant
Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P. & Anr. MANU/SC/0147/2011
M/s. Saluja Constructions v. State of M.P. and another MANU/MP/0279/2002
Tags : chhattisgarh arbitration order recall interest of justice
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