Judgments
Supreme Court
State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Shaik Mahibulla Sharief
MANU/SC/0197/2017
22.02.2017
Service
Candidate Eligible for Appointment as Language Pandit (Telugu) as Rules did not Disqualify a Degree From Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University
In facts of present case, Appellants were directed by Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad to consider the Respondent for appointment to post of Language Pandit (Telugu) Grade-II. High Court confirmed said direction by dismissing Writ Petition filed by Appellants. Appellants have filed this Appeal challenging the correctness of the judgment of High Court. Question for consideration is whether the qualification of BA Telugu literature as a single subject from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University can be considered as equivalent to bachelor's degree with Telugu as main subject.
In present case, Tribunal held that Respondent possessed B. Ed. degree with Telugu and Social Studies as methodology subjects and BA in Telugu literature as single subject from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University. According to Tribunal, Respondent was eligible for being considered for appointment as Language Pandit (Telugu) as Rules did not disqualify a degree from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University. On basis of said findings, Tribunal directed Appellants to consider case of Respondent for appointment to post of Language Pandit (Telugu) Grade-II.
Admittedly, Respondent possesses BA with History, Economics and Political Science and B. Ed. with Telugu and Social Studies as methodology subjects. He also possesses BA in Telugu literature as a single subject from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University. Memo dated 03.10.2005 is a clarification pertaining to transfer of teachers/officers and rationalisation of schools. The directions given by Government to the Director of School Education would clearly show that degree issued by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University was considered to be equivalent to any other degree in respect of a selection conducted in the year 2003. If Government has considered the degree issued by the Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University as equivalent to any other degree for DSC-2003 and permitted appointment of similarly situated persons, there is no reason why the Respondent can be said to be ineligible. There is nothing in Rules which makes a degree issued by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Open University which is recognised by the University Grants Commission (UGC) from being considered as equivalent to any other degree.
Tags : Rules Appointment Eligibility
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Supreme Court
Satish Kumar Gupta v. State of Haryana & Ors.
MANU/SC/0196/2017
21.02.2017
Land Acquisition
Post-acquisition Allottee has no Locus to be Heard in the Matter and is Neither a Necessary Nor a Proper Party
Instant appeals have been preferred against judgment and order passed by High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Question for consideration is whether a post-acquisition allottee of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation under the scheme of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and if not, whether impugned order permitting additional evidence and directing remand is sustainable.
Acquisition may either be for a “public purpose” as defined under Section 3(f) of Act or for a company under Part-VII of the Act. If acquisition is for a public purpose (as present case), land vests in State after Collector makes an award and the possession is taken. Till award is made, no person other than State comes into the picture. Once land vests in State, acquisition is complete. Any transferee from State is not concerned with the process of acquisition. State may transfer land by public auction or by allotment at any price with which the person whose land is acquired has no concern. Mere fact that Government chooses to determine the allotment price with reference to compensation price determined by the Court does not provide any locus to an allottee to contest the claim for enhancement of compensation.
Post-acquisition allottee cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated at par with beneficiary for whom the land was acquired. Accordingly, Supreme Court held that, post-acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper party. The other part of the impugned order permitting additional evidence and remanding the case for fresh decision is uncalled for. No case was made out for permitting additional evidence on settled principles under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC.
It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up weak points in the case. Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the High Court once again for fresh decision in accordance with law.
Relevant
Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya, Jind and Anr. v. Municipal Committee, Jind and Ors. : 1988 (Supp) SCC 719; MANU/SC/0186/1988
Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan (Dead) by legal representatives and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Anr. : (2015) 10 SCC 469; MANU/SC/0828/2015
Tags : Post-acquisition Allottee Locus standii
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Supreme Court
Jayakantham & Others v. Abaykumar
MANU/SC/0193/2017
21.02.2017
Contract
Jurisdiction to Decree Specific Performance is Discretionary. Yet, Discretion of Court is Not Arbitrary but is “Sound and Reasonable”, to be “Guided by Judicial Principles”
Instant Appeal arises from a judgment rendered by a Single Judge of Madras High Court. Dismissing second appeal, Single Judge confirmed judgment of Principal District Judge, by which an appeal against judgment of Sub-Judge was dismissed. Trial court decreed suit for specific performance instituted by Respondent against Appellants. Appellants submitted that this is a fit and proper case where specific performance ought not to be ordered and a decree for compensation in lieu thereof would meet the ends of justice.
Section 20(1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 indicates that, jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary. Yet, discretion of Court is not arbitrary but is “sound and reasonable”, to be “guided by judicial principles”. Exercise of discretion is capable of being corrected by a Court of appeal in hierarchy of appellate Courts. Sub-section 2 of Section 20 of Act contains a stipulation of those cases where the court may exercise its discretion not to grant specific performance.
However, explanation 1 stipulates that mere inadequacy of consideration, or mere fact that, contract is onerous to Defendant or improvident in its nature, will not constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Moreover, explanation 2 requires that the issue as to whether performance of a contract involves hardship on the defendant has to be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract, except where the hardship has been caused from an act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract.
In present case, material on record contains several aspects which will have to weigh in the balance. There is no dispute about fact that, father of the respondent who entered into an agreement on his behalf (and deposed in evidence) carried on money-lending business. The consistent case of Appellants in reply to the legal notice, in the written statement as well as in the course of evidence was that there was a transaction of a loan with the father of Respondent.
Material which has been placed on record indicates that, terms of contract, conduct of parties at time of entering into agreement and circumstances under which contract was entered into gave Plaintiff an unfair advantage over defendants. These circumstances make it inequitable to enforce specific performance. A decree for the payment of compensation in lieu of specific performance would meet the ends of justice.
Father of Respondent paid an amount of Rs. 60 thousand to the appellants in June 1999 of the total agreed consideration of Rs. 1.60 lakhs. Appellants have voluntarily offered to pay an amount of Rs. 10 lakhs, as just compensation in lieu of specific performance. Decree for specific performance is set aside and substituted with a direction to Appellants to pay a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs to the respondent in lieu of specific performance.
Tags : Payment Specific performance
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High Court of Delhi
Jaspreet Singh@Golu v. State and Anr.
MANU/DE/0460/2017
20.02.2017
Criminal
There Should be no Impediment in Quashing the FIR, if COURT is Otherwise Satisfied that the Facts and Circumstances of Case so Warrant
Present writ petition has been filed by Petitioner, for quashing of FIR No. 604/2016, under Sections 323/354/506/509/34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 registered at Police Station Tilak Nagar, Delhi on basis of a mediation executed between Petitioner and Respondents Nos. 2 & 3. Respondents present in Court submitted that, dispute between parties has been amicably resolved with accused/petitioner after entering into a compromise through mediation. Respondents affirmed contents of compromise. All the disputes and differences have been resolved through mutual consent. Now no dispute with Petitioner survives and so, proceedings arising out of FIR in question may be brought to an end.
Inherent powers of High Court ought to be exercised to prevent abuse of process of law and to secure ends of justice. Respondent agreed to the quashing of criminal complaint in question and stated that matter has been settled out of her own free will. As matter has been settled and compromised amicably, so, there would be an extraordinary delay in process of law if the legal proceedings between parties are carried on. Court is of opinion that this is a fit case to invoke the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process of law and to secure the ends of justice.
Incorporation of inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is meant to deal with situation in absence of express provision of law to secure ends of justice such as, where process is abused or misused; where ends of justice cannot be secured; where process of law is used for unjust or unlawful object; to avoid causing of harassment to any person by using the provision of Cr.P.C. or to avoid the delay of legal process in delivery of justice. Inherent power is not to be exercised to circumvent the express provisions of law.
It is a settled law that, inherent power of High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly. Apex Court in case of State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram Anatrai Doshi and Ors. and in case of Inder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal has observed that powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. must be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution. Only when Court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the Court, if such power is not exercised, Court would quash the proceedings.
It is a well settled law that where High Court is convinced that, offences are entirely personal in nature and therefore do not affect public peace or tranquility and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, pursuing prosecution would be waste of time and energy. Non-compoundable offences are basically an obstruction in entering into compromise. In certain cases, main offence is compoundable but the connected offences are not.
In case of B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another 2003 (4) SCC 675 Apex Court observed that even though the provisions of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. would not apply to such offences which are not compoundable, it did not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Apex Court laid down that if for purpose of securing ends of justice, quashing of FIR/Criminal complaint becomes necessary, Section 320 of Cr.P.C. would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. Apex Court justified exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings to secure ends of justice in view of special facts and circumstances of the case, even where offences were non-compoundable.
This Court is of view that notwithstanding the fact, offence under Section 354 of IPC is a non-compoundable offence, there should be no impediment in quashing the FIR under this section, if Court is otherwise satisfied that the facts and circumstances of the case so warrant. High court allowed the petition and quashed FIR No.604/2016, under Section 323/354/506/509/34 of IPC registered at Police Station Tilak Nagar, Delhi and proceedings emanating therefrom against Petitioners.
Relevant
State of Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram Anatrai Doshi and Ors., Inder Singh Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal
Tags : FIR Quashing Discretion
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National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Secretary/Manager, Mayyanad Regional Co-Operative Bank v. Ebrahimkutty
MANU/CF/0108/2017
20.02.2017
Consumer
Bank is Liable to Pay Compensation, if the Original Title Deed had been Lost
Instant first appeal has been filed against the impugned order passed by Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission vide which, Consumer Complaint No. C-05/13, filed by present Respondent, was allowed and Appellant/opposite party (OP) was directed to return the original sale deed number 1959/92 to complainant within one month, failing which to provide compensation of 10 lakh with interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of petition till realisation.
In facts of case, complainant/respondent availed a loan from Appellant, by mortgaging his property. Complainant repaid his loan, but OP Bank did not return the original title deed. It has been stated that the Bank orally informed him in the year 1999 that the original deed was missing, and the OP Bank was on search to recover the same. Complainant stated that, property was valued at about Rs. 75 lakhs and due to lack of original document, complainant was unable to sell property to the third parties. Alleging deficiency in service on part of the OP Bank, consumer complaint was filed, seeking compensation from OP for deficiency in service/unfair trade practices etc.
Affidavit executed on 31st October, 2013 establishes beyond doubt that, Bank has always been taking the position that, document has been 'misplaced' and not 'lost'. In consumer complaint itself, complainant took the plea that, when loan was closed finally on 8th September, 2012, he was informed by OP that document of title deed had been lost.
In case, Bank takes stand that document had been 'misplaced', there shall still be a possibility that, document could be recovered at a later stage and returned to complainant. However, if Bank had intimated to the complainant that, documents had been "lost", cause of action would have started from date of receiving said intimation. In present case, therefore, it is established beyond doubt that since Bank has been taking the stand that, document was 'misplaced', cause of action had not accrued to complainant all these years, and hence, complaint filed by them cannot be stated to be beyond limitation in terms of Section 24A of Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
Facts of case make it clear that, cause of action would have accrued form date of intimation of loss of document to complainant. OP/appellant allowed the complainant to avail himself of loans from time to time all these years, even in the event of title deed having been misplaced/lost. However, this does not mean that other financing institutions shall also extend the loan facility to the complainant in the absence of title deed. It is made out, therefore, that, complainant did suffer due to loss of title deeds. Deficiency in service on part of the Bank is clearly established, because title deed under their custody got lost.
In Bank of India vs. Mustafa Ibrahim Nadiadwala and Indian Overseas Bank, Hyderabad vs. K. Bal Reddy & Ors., it was held that Bank was liable to pay compensation to the complainant, because value of property was bound to be affected, if original title deed had been lost. However, compensation of Rs. 10 lakh alongwith interest @ 12% p.a. allowed by State Commission is on the higher side. In view of orders passed by this Commission in, "Bank of India vs. Mustafa Ibrahim Nadiadwala", and "LIC Housing Finance Company Ltd. vs. Rajeev Kumar Jain", OP/appellant shall be liable to pay a sum of Rs. 5 lakh to the complainant for the loss of title deed alongwith Rs. 10,000/- as cost of litigation.
Tags : Compensation Entitlement Limitation
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National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Rajesh Kumar V. National Insurance Company Limited and Ors.
MANU/CF/0109/2017
20.02.2017
Consumer
Terms and Conditions of Policy have to be Strictly Construed to Determine Extent of Liability of Insurer
Instant revision petition has been filed against the impugned order passed by Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Appeal No. 1192/2014, vide which, order passed by District Forum Kurukshetra, partly allowing complaint No. 24/2013, filed by present Petitioner, was set aside. State Commission held that there was fundamental breach of terms and conditions of policy on part of complainant, as vehicle was being used as a taxi.
Perusal of reply filed by OP Insurance Company before District Forum and orders passed by State Commission as well as District Forum reveals that after alleged incident, an FIR was registered by father of the Complainant before the local police, in which it was stated that three persons came to Complainant, when he was standing at the taxi stand. He settled a fare of Rs. 700/- with them for taking them to Ambala Cantt. However, when they were on their way, occupants of the car snatched the vehicle. Facts in present case revealed that, vehicle was being used as a taxi although it was insured as a private vehicle.
In the case of Suraj Mal Ram Niwas Oil Mills Private Limited vs. United India Insurance Company Limited & Anr, it was stated that it needs little emphasis that in construing the terms of a contract of insurance, words used therein must be given paramount importance, and it is not open for the court to add, delete or substitute any words. It is also well settled that since upon issuance of an insurance policy, the insurer undertakes to indemnify the loss suffered by the insured on account of risks covered by the policy, its terms have to be strictly construed to determine the extent of liability of the insurer. Therefore, the endeavour of the court should always be to interpret the words in which the contract is expressed by the parties.
It is clear from facts and circumstances of case that, there has been a fundamental breach of the terms and conditions of policy, because use of vehicle for commercial purpose as a taxi is duly proved. There is no illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the orders passed by the State Commission, and the same is upheld.
Relevant
Suraj Mal Ram Niwas Oil Mills Private Limited vs. United India Insurance Company Limited & Anr. MANU/SC/0814/2010
Tags : Claim Eligibility Terms and conditions Policy
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