Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T.S. Thakur, C.J.I. and A.M. Khanwilkar JUDGMENT
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals challenge the judgment and final order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad dated 11th July 2013 in Writ Petition (PIL) No. 144 of 2011 and Writ Petition (PIL) No. 13 of 2013.
3. The Respondent No. 1 had filed a Writ Petition as Public Interest Litigation for issuance of direction against Respondent No. 3 to 5 (State Authorities) to remove the illegal encroachment and structure erected by the Appellant on a Municipal Land behind Urdu Kumar Shala No. 7 and on the public road going from Bharwadi Road and the surrounding area. The High Court on the basis of the information furnished, noticed that besides the structure referred to in the Writ Petition, there were in all 869 leases given by the Municipality to different persons without authority of law and on which constructions have been put up without any formal lease executed in favour of concerned persons/occupants nor the approval of the State Government in terms of Section 65 of Gujarat Municipality Act, 1963 was obtained. The Division Bench after analysing Sections 65, 80 and 146 of the Act and the decisions in Parasram Manjimal and Ors. v. The Kalol Municipality, Kalol 
MANU/GJ/0051/1972 : AIR 1972 Guj. 54 (para 7), Dipak Kumar Mukherjee v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Ors.1, Sri K. Ramadas Shenoy v. The Chief Officers, Town Municipal Council, Udipi and Ors. MANU/SC/0082/1974 : (1974)2 SCC 506 And Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa and Ors. MANU/SC/0933/2004 : (2004) 8 SCC 733 held that ordinarily public streets must be used by the Municipality as public streets for the public right of way and cannot be let out or allowed to be used for any other purpose. It held that the Municipality is a trustee and must, therefore, ensure that public streets are not encroached upon. Further, the Municipality cannot lease out any portion of the public street. The High Court in paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment, noted the concession given by the counsel for the Municipality that none of the resolutions granting lease rights to private person(s) were approved by the General Board of the Municipality and that the subject structures were allowed to be constructed in absence of any formal sanction given by the Competent Authority in that behalf. Paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment reads thus: