G.P. Mathur JUDGMENT
S. Rajendra Babu, J.
W.P.(C) No. 389/2002 & W.P.(Crl) No. 89/2002:
1. In this batch of Writ Petitions before us the Constitutional validity of various provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (hereinafter POTA) is in challenge.
2. The Petitioners' contended before us that since the provisions of POTA, in pith and substance, fall under the Entry 1 (Public Order) of List II Parliament lacks legislative competence. To authenticate this contention, the decision in Rehman Shagoo and Ors. v. State of Jammu KashmirMANU/SC/0028/1959 : , 1960CriLJ126 , is relied upon. According to them, the menace of terrorism is covered by the Entry "Public Order" and to explain the meaning thereof, our attention is invited to decisions in Romesh Thaper v. State of MadrasMANU/SC/0006/1950 : , 1950CriLJ1514 , Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of BiharMANU/SC/0054/1965, : 1966CriLJ608 , and Madhu Limaye v. SDM, MonghyrMANU/SC/0147/1970 : , 1971CriLJ1720 . The Petitioners thus submitted that terrorist activity is confined only to State(s) and therefore State(s) only have the competence to enact a legislation.
3. The learned Attorney General refuting this contention submitted that acts of terrorism, which are aimed at weakening the sovereignty and integrity of the country cannot be equated with mere breaches of law and order and disturbances of public order or public safety. He argued that the concept of "sovereignty and integrity of India" is distinct and separate from the concepts of "public order" or "security of State" which fall under List II enabling States to enact legislation relating to public order or safety affecting or relating to a particular State. Therefore, the legislative competence of a State to enact laws for its security cannot denude Parliament of its competence under List I to enact laws to safeguard national security and sovereignty of India by preventing and punishing acts of terrorism. Learned Attorney General distinguished the decision in Rehman Shagoo and submitted that the legislation dealt with therein is fundamentally and qualitatively different from POTA. He also argued before us that Rehman Shagoo cannot mitigate the binding ratio and unanimous conclusion reached by this Court on the point of legislative competence in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, MANU/SC/1597/1994 : 1956CriLJ945 , that Parliament