Shekhar B. Saraf ORDER
Shekhar B. Saraf, J.
1. Heard Sri Abhishek Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ravi Shanker Pandey, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State.
2. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated January 18, 2022 passed by the appellate authority being the Additional Commissioner, Grade-II (Appeal)-1st, Commercial Tax, Agra under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").
3. By the aforesaid order, the appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner on the ground that the same was time barred as it was filed beyond the period of four months. In the order impugned, it has clearly been pointed out by the the appellate authority that the order impugned has been passed on August 2, 2019, whereas the appeal was filed on December 27, 2021, that is, after the period of more than 28 months and way beyond the time prescribed under Section 107 of the Act.
4. Perusal of the record shows that the appeal was filed beyond time and when there is no dispute with regard to filing of the appeal beyond the time prescribed, this Court under the extraordinary jurisdiction cannot interfere with the appellate authority's order as the application of Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to Section 107 of the Act.
5. The Supreme Court in Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Others reported in MANU/SC/0015/2008 : (2008) 3 SCC 70, while dealing with a similar issue as in the present case, has held as under:
"8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible period provided under the statute. The period up to which the prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short "the Limitation Act") can be availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section 35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be preferred within three months from the date of communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days' time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clea........