Dipankar Datta JUDGMENT
Dipankar Datta, J.
1. Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereafter the SARFAESI Act) is at the centre of controversy in all but one of these writ petitions, which have been presented by borrowers/a secured creditor seeking to challenge orders passed thereunder by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta/the District Magistrates of various districts in the state (hereafter the CMM/DM, wherever referred to jointly). The writ petition that stands out from this group, without challenging the section 14 order operating in the field, challenges the action of dispossession following such an order. Since interpretation of section 14 would arise as a matter of necessity, these writ petitions shall be governed by this common judgment and order.
2. Making a departure from the usual course of ascertaining the factual matrix of each writ petition first, I propose to record the submissions advanced in regard to the scope, effect and import of section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the issues that would emerge for decision based thereon and my understanding of the law, and then I shall apply the law to each case separately.
3. While arguing W.P. 11828(W) of 2015, Mr. Basu, learned advocate for the petitioner was heard submitting that law had undergone a sea change in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in MANU/SC/0377/2014 : (2014) 6 SCC 1 (Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Asset Reconstruction Pvt. Ltd.) and an application under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act cannot be disposed of by the CMM/DM granting the prayer for assistance without putting the borrower on notice. Considering such broad submission, Mr. Joy Saha, learned advocate was requested to assist the Bench as amicus curiae. Elaborate submissions have been advanced by Mr. Saha and I record my appreciation for the efforts put in by him.
4. According to Mr. Saha, prior to amendment of section 14, law was fairly well-settled that the CMM/DM was under no obligation to give any notice either to a borrower or to any third party and that an order passed thereunder followed a non-adjudicatory process, which was purely executionary in nature. Reference was made by him to the decisions reported in MANU/TN/1022/2008 : AIR 2009 Madras 10 (Indian Overseas Bank v. M/s. Sree Aravindh Steels Ltd.), MANU/MH/0238/2009 : AIR 2010 Bombay 53 (M/s. Puran Maharashtra Automobiles, Aurangabad v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Aurangabad), and MANU/CG/0137/2010 : AIR 2010 Chhattisgarh 83 [Ramdas Agrawal v. Collector (District Magistrate) District Durg].
5. It was, however, contended by Mr. Saha that with the advent of the amendments in section 14 and the decision in Harshad Govardhan Sondagar (supra), there has been a radical change in law. He urged that the Supreme Court in such decision while holding that the district magistrate is to give an opportunity of hearing to the lessees and to pass orders in conformity with the principles of natural justice has not indicated that such right of hearing is available only to the lessees/tenants and it would be to the exclusion of all other categories of aggrieved persons. To put it differently, Harshad Govardhan Sondagar (supr........