MANU/SC/0106/2011

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1383 of 2007

Decided On: 10.02.2011

Appellants: Indra Das Vs. Respondent: State of Assam

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Misra

JUDGMENT

Markandey Katju, J.

1. Heard learned Counsel for the Appellant. Service of Notice of Lodgment of petition of Appeal is complete, but no one has entered appearance on behalf of the sole Respondent-State.

2. The facts of the case are similar to the facts in Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam Criminal Appeal No. 889 of 2007, which we allowed on 3.2.2011.

3. As in the case of Arup Bhuyan (supra), the only evidence against the Appellant in this case is his alleged confession made to a police officer, for which he was charged under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (in short `TADA')

4. The facts of the case are that one Anil Kumar Das went missing from the evening of 6.11.1991, and his dead body was recovered after two months on 19.1.1992 from the river Dishang. Five persons including the Appellant were charged for his death. The Appellant was not named in the FIR. No prosecution witness has attributed any role to the Appellant. The charge sheet in the case was filed after a gap of nine years from the date of the commission of the offence, and charges were framed more than four years after filing of the charge sheet. There is no evidence against the Appellant except the confessional statement.

5. The alleged confession was subsequently retracted by the Appellant. The alleged confession was not corroborated by any other material. We have held in Arup Bhuyan's case (supra) that confession is a very weak type of evidence, particularly when alleged to have been made to the police, and it is not safe to convict on its basis unless there is adequate corroborative material. In the present case there is no corroborative material.

6. However, the Appellant has been convicted under Section 3(5) of TADA which makes mere membership of a banned organization a criminal act, and sentenced to five years rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 2000/- fine.

7. In Arup Bhuyan's case (supra) we have stated that mere membership of a banned organization cannot incriminate a person unless he is proved to have resorted to acts of violence or incited people to imminent violence, or does an act intended to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to imminent violence. In the present case, even assuming that the Appellant was a member of ULFA which is a banned organization, there is no evidence to show that he did acts of the nature above mentioned. Thus, even if he was a member of ULFA it has not been proved that he was an active member and not merely a passive member. Hence the decision in Arup Bhuyan's case (supra) squarely applies in this case.

8. In our judgment in State of Kerala v. Raneef MANU/SC/0001/2011 : 2011(1) Scale 8 we had referred to the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Elfbrandt v. Russell 384 US 17(1966) which rejected the doctrine of `guilt by association'.

9. In Elfbrandt's case (supra) Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court observed:

Those who join an organization but do not share its unlawful purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no threat. This Act threatens the ch........