T.K. Thommen ORDER
T.K. Thommen, J.
1. This civil appeal by special leave is brought by the defendants against the judgment of the Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench, in Second Appeal No. 125 of 1977 dismissing in limine their appeal against the judgment of the learned District Judge in Title Appeal No. 2/5 of 1977 whereby the decree for eviction granted by the learned Munsiff in Title Suit No. 3 of 1975 was in part affirmed.
2. The plaintiffs (respondents) instituted the suit against the defendants (appellants) for eviction under Section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 on the ground that the defendants were in arrears of rent for the months of February 1974 and May 1974 to August 1974. The defendants contested the suit on various grounds. Their main defence was that they were not in arrears of rent as alleged by the plaintiffs. Decreeing the suit, the learned Munsiff found that rent for the months of February 1974 and May 1974 to August 1974 had not been paid by the defendants. This decree was affirmed by the learned District Judge in part, that is, in respect of the alleged arrears for the months of May and June 1974, and not for any other period. The finding of the First Appellate Court was affirmed by the High Court by dismissing the defendants' appeal in limine.
3. The question which arises for consideration is whether the courts below were justified in coming to the conclusion, which they did, and whether the impugned judgment of the High Court is liable to be interfered with in the present appeal brought by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.
4. Whether or not rent for the two months in question had been duly paid by the defendants is a question of fact, and with a finding of such fact, this Court does not ordinarily interfere in proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution, particularly when all the courts below reached the same conclusion. But where the finding of fact is based on no evidence or opposed to the totality of evidence and contrary to the rational conclusion to which the state of evidence must reasonably lead, then this Court will in the exercise of its discretion intervene to prevent miscarriage of justice.
5. The suit was instituted by the widow of Rameswarlal Sultania. The plaint was verified by Rameswarlal Sultania's nephew on behalf of the plaintiffs, and he deposed as PW-4. Neither the first plaintiff, the widow nor the other two plaintiffs, her children testified in support of the plaint allegations. The nephew , PW-4 frankly admitted in the box that he had no personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the plaint. He did not know if the defendants were in arrears of rent or whether his aunt, the first plaintiffs or anybody else had demanded rent from the defendants. None of the witnesses on the side of the plaintiffs had any personal knowledge of the facts alleged by the plaintiffs in regard to the arrears of rent. PW-4 is, amongst the plaintiff's witnesses, the only person who speaks to this fact, but admittedly speaks without any claim of personal knowledge. In the circumstances, there is no reliable oral evidence on the side of the plaintiffs to support the plaint allegation regarding the arrears of rent. Nor is there any documentary evidence in support of their case.
6. On the other hand, the defendants categorically stated that they had paid the rent for the two months in ques........