M.K. Hanjura ORDER
M.K. Hanjura, J.
1. These three appeals raise akin and analogues issues and have, therefore, been clubbed together for determination and decision.
2. This appeal bearing No. CIMA 616/2014 filed under Order 43 Rule 1 Clause (U) against the order of the learned Principal District Judge, Kishtwar, passed in File No. 11 titled Krishan Lal v. Zakir Hussain and Others, where under the learned Principal District Judge has accepted the appeal of the respondent and remanded the case to the learned Sub Judge, Kishtwar, for accord of fresh consideration to it in light of issue No. 3 framed in the suit.
3. The background facts of the case are that the respondent filed a Civil Suit for possession by enforcement of the right of prior purchase against the appellants herein. The suit was contested by the appellants and it ultimately came to be dismissed by the learned trial Court, i.e., Sub Judge, Kishtwar, vide his judgment dated 26.09.2013. The respondent assailed the judgment of the learned Sub Judge before the Court of the learned Principal District Judge, Kishtwar, and the learned District Judge vide an order dated 18.12.2014 (impugned herein), remanded the matter to the learned Sub Judge.
4. Aggrieved of the order of the remand, the appellants have challenged its vires on the grounds, inter alia, that the same is contrary to the settled law of the land. The Principal District Judge has held that the communication of the intended price at which the sale was offered to the respondents has not been communicated to the respondents herein, and therefore, it goes to the very root of the stand of the appellant No. 7, that he had offered to sell the property initially to the plaintiff, who had shown his reluctance and had practically denied to purchase the same. Section 18 of the Right of Prior Purchase Act (herein after referred as "the Act"), does not defeat the right of prior purchase under the doctrine of estoppel and the other relevant principles relating to estoppel, as are governed under the Evidence Act. In fact it is not necessary in law, that the procedure as envisaged under Chapter IV of the right of Prior Purchase Act, should be strictly followed for pleading waiver of the right of the prior purchase, and reference by the learned Principal District Judge to the absence of evidence with respect to non-communication of the price at which it was offered by appellant No. 7 to the respondent having not been proved, the same would defeat the plea of appellants with respect to waiver/estoppel against respondent, is wholly misplaced, illegal and contrary to the law on the subject. It is also stated that the first appellate Court has failed to notice that the plaintiff/respondent himself has sufficiently proved that he had the knowledge of the sale. The plaintiff/respondent has himself pleaded in his plaint that notice had not been issued to him by the appellant No. 7, as per the procedure and, as such, he had the right of prior purchase. The respondent has not pleaded, that he was not offered the sale property by the appellant No. 5 in the first instance and instead has taken a technical plea, which could be only a brain child of the drafter of the plaint, where he has referred to the absence of the notice under the procedure relating to Section 18 of the Act. The appellants filed their written statement, in which a plea had been taken denying the allegation of the plaintiff. It has been pleaded clearly, cleanly and unambiguously, that the respondent had been offered to purchase the land in the first instance where after the plaintiff/respondent had, after he being asked to purchase the land refused to do so. It had further been pleaded that it was the plaintiff who had in fact asked and persuaded the appellant Nos. 1 to 6 to purchase the land. To offset any assertion of the appellants, which was very specific to the question of offer, there had been no rejoinder/re-application filed b........