Judgments
Supreme Court
Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Mandala Yadagari Goud and Ors.
MANU/SC/0507/2019
09.04.2019
Motor Vehicles
It is the age of deceased which has to be taken into account and not age of dependents while determining compensation
The only legal issue canvassed in present matters, which were in the nature of cross appeals, is that, in the case of a motor accident where there is death of a person, who is a bachelor, whether the age of the deceased or the age of the dependents would be taken into account for calculating the multiplier. The Appellant is the insurance company, whose counsel submits that, it is the age of the dependents which has to be taken into account and thus the High Court has fallen into an error by taking the multiplier on the basis of the age of the deceased.
The concept of insurance for a motor vehicle is to cover risk in case of an accident. The insurance policy covers personal risk of injury or death, including for third parties. The premium charged in this behalf is uniform.
The judicial pronouncements of this Court have endeavoured to devise a standard formula, in respect of the calculation of the amount of compensation qua various components. The amount of compensation determined is to be paid to the claimants who are dependents in case of a death of a person based on what the deceased would have contributed to their support. The amount thus received by the dependents in turn becomes a part of the estate as they may live longer or may be younger than the age limits taken into account for calculation of a multiplier to be applied in such a situation.
The focus for determination of such claim is the deceased and what would be his contribution towards the dependents would he to be alive, for the benefits of the dependents. It is trite to say, and in fact conceded by the learned Counsel for the insurance company, that in case the deceased is a married person, it is the age of the deceased which is to be taken into account. In case the deceased is a bachelor, a different principle for calculation of the multiplier should not be applied by shifting the focus to the age of the claimants. Once the law is settled, it should not be repeatedly changed as that itself causes confusion and litigation.
A reading of the judgment in Sube Singh shows that, where a three Judge Bench has categorically taken the view that, it is the age of the deceased and not the age of the parents that would be the factor for the purposes of taking the multiplier to be applied.
There is no need to once again take up the issue settled by the judgments of three Judge Bench. It is the age of the deceased which has to be taken into account and not the age of the dependents. The appeal filed by the insurance company without merit. Appeals dismissed.
Relevant
Sube Singh and Anr. v. Shaym Singh (Dead) and Ors. MANU/SC/0106/2018
, Reshma Kumari and Ors. v. Madan Mohan and Anr. MANU/SC/0287/2013
Tags : Compensation Age Deceased
Share : 
Top
Supreme Court
Kushuma Devi Vs. Sheopati Devi (D) and Ors.
MANU/SC/0490/2019
08.04.2019
Civil
Every judicial or quasi-judicial order passed by Court must be supported with reasons in support of its conclusion
The Appellant filed an eviction petition against the Respondents. By order, the Civil Judge decreed the suit and passed the decree for eviction against the Respondents. The Respondents felt aggrieved and filed Rent Appeal. The first Appellate Court by order allowed the appeal and dismissed the eviction petition filed by the Appellant. By impugned order, the High Court dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the order passed by the Additional District Judge, in the absence of the Appellant. The Appellant filed an application for recall of the order. The High Court by order dismissed the said application. Issue raised in present case is whether High Court was justified in simply dismissing the writ petition without assigning any reason.
Present Court has consistently laid down that, every judicial or/and quasi-judicial order passed by the Court/Tribunal/Authority concerned, which decides the lis between the parties, must be supported with the reasons in support of its conclusion. The parties to the lis and so also the appellate/revisionary Court while examining the correctness of the order are entitled to know as to on which basis, a particular conclusion is arrived at in the order. In the absence of any discussion, the reasons and the findings on the submissions urged, it is not possible to know as to what led the Court/Tribunal/Authority for reaching to such conclusion.
The orders impugned in present appeals suffer from error as the High Court while passing the impugned order simply dismissed the writ petition without any discussion, finding and the reason. The impugned orders are set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the writ petition afresh. Appeal allowed.
Tags : Judicial order Reasoning Absence
Share :
Top
High Court of Bombay
Ashwin Liladhar Shah Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Ors.
MANU/MH/0578/2019
04.04.2019
Insurance
Insurer is liable to pay interest in case of delay beyond the timeline prescribed in Regulation
Present Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeks a writ of mandamus to Respondent No. 1- Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), directing it to honour the LIC Policy issued to late Ms. Bharati Bheda. The late Ms. Bheda, the assured had during her life time nominated the Petitioner as the beneficiary of the said policy. Therefore, in terms of the record of the LIC, it be directed to make over the amounts due including interest thereon under the said policy to the Petitioner as the nominee of the assured.
The Petitioner states that, the interest has not been paid fully on the amount due under the said policy. The Respondent submitted that, delay was attributable to the Petitioner and, therefore, interest as paid is sufficient recompense for the delay.
In terms of the Insurance Regulatory Development Authority of India (Protection of Policyholders' Interest) Regulations, 2017 (Regulations), the claim has to be settled at the highest within a period of 135 days from the date of making the claim even in case where investigation is to be done. Therefore, in case, there is any delay beyond the timeline prescribed in Regulation 14(2) (i) of the Regulation, then in terms of Regulation 14 (2) (ii) of the Regulation, the insurer i.e. Respondent No. 1-LIC is liable to pay interest at the rate which is 2% above bank rate from the date of the receipt of the last necessary documents to enable the LIC to honor its commitment in terms of the policy.
In present case, admittedly, the last document which was required by LIC was furnished on 5th February, 2018. Thus, the Respondent No. 1-LIC as a Life Insurer has to grant interest suo moto to the Petitioner on account of delay without waiting for any specific demand being made by the assured or his nominee as provided in Regulation 14 (2)(vi) of the said Regulations. The principal amount due under the said policy to the assurer's nominee i.e. Petitioner herein has been paid by the Respondent No. 1-LIC. This payment has been made during the pendency of this Petition.
Under Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938, a nominee of a policy holder is entitled to be paid by the Insurer in the event of the death of the policy holder. The Respondent No. 1-LIC does not dispute that, the payment under the said policy is due to assured Ms. Bheda's nominee - Petitioner herein. It is also not disputed that, the claim made by the Petitioner was completed on 5th February, 2018. The timeline provided in Regulation 14 of the said Regulation would commence from 6th February, 2018. The delay, thereafter, on account of the Respondent No. 1.-LIC seeking an Indemnity Bond from the Petitioner was completely unwarranted as there is no such requirement under the said policy.
In fact, in terms of Regulation 14 of the said Regulation, the obligation of the insurer on receipt of the claim is to the process the same without delay. Questions/clarification, if any by the LIC should be asked within 15 days of the receipt of the claim. Therefore, the amounts due under the policy should be paid within 30 days of the receipt of all relevant and supporting papers from the claimant. In case, any investigation is warranted, same has to be initiated at the earliest and completed within 90 days from the date of the receipt of the claim and thereafter, the claim shall be settled within 30 days thereafter.
In this case, nothing has been shown which could warrant any investigation of the part of the insurer-LIC before it could honour the claim made by the nominee of the assured. Thus, there is no justification warranting the LIC delaying the payment under the said policy. Thus, it is liable to pay interest in terms of the Regulation 14 of the said Regulations.
Non-payment of interest after 30 days of making complete claim i.e. 5th February, 2018 as in present case would lead to a loss to the estate of the deceased assured. Thus, Respondent No. 1-LIC is obliged to pay interest at 2% higher then the bank rate. The Respondent No. 1-LIC would compute the interest payable to the Petitioner in terms of Regulation 14 of the Regulations and pay interest to the Petitioner till 1st December, 2018. Accordingly, Petition allowed.
Tags : LIC Policy Payment Delay Interest
Share :
Top
High Court of Delhi
Bijender Singh Meena Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors.
MANU/DE/1145/2019
04.04.2019
Service
An employee directly recruited vis-a-vis another who is promoted must be treated equal in all respects
Vide the present petition, the Petitioner has challenged the order by which the Respondents has rejected the representation of the Petitioner to grant the benefits and arrears of pay fixation of selection grade pay of Rs 3100 w.e.f. 7th June, 1996 and pay revision based on that. He further seeks upgradation as per the approval of the Board of Directors in their Resolution dated 12th March, 2014. He also seeks benefits of TBPS (Time Bound Promotional Scale) as given to the other similarly placed employees of the IPGCL with financial benefits as a consequence of quashing the order dated 30th March, 2016.
The Board of Directors on 7th November, 2012 vide Resolution No. 62.2.13 and 59.2.9 approved unified Rules of promotion as well as rationalisation of scales/grade pay/posts in IPGCL/PPCL. In para 3.4 of the said Resolution, it is proposed that only ` 3100 grade pay may be treated as selection grade and all the employees (as against 30% proposed earlier) who meet the basic eligibility of promotion may be granted the grade pay of ` 3100 on completion of 5 years of regular service, subject to fitness by DPC.
In the case of Union of India vs. Atul Shukla, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there can be no differential treatment between an employee directly recruited vis-a-vis another who is promoted. So long as the two employees are a part of the same cadre, they cannot be treated differently either for purposes of pay and allowances or other conditions of service, including the age of superannuation. They must be treated equal in all respects i.e. salary, other benefits and the age of superannuation.
The Petitioner was re-designated as a Fitter Mechanic Grade-II in the pay band of ` 8500-26300 in the grade pay of ` 3100 w.e.f. 7th June, 1996 as per rules of Unified Rules of Promotion as well as rationalization of scales/grade pay/posts in IPGCL/PPCL by the office order with the approval of the Board of Directors vide Board Resolution No. 62.2.13 and 59.2.9 dated 7th November, 2012. Thereafter, vide office order dated 6th May, 2014, the Respondents had placed seven employees of Annexure P-4 from serial No. 01 to 07 from W-4 level to W-5 level leaving behind the Petitioner which was discriminatory and arbitrary order of the Respondents.
The Memorandum dated 30th March, 2016 passed by the Respondents is quashed. Consequently, the Petitioner is entitled to the benefits and arrears of pay fixation of selection grade pay of ` 3100 w.e.f. 7th June, 1996 and pay revision with further upgradation as per the approval of the Board of Directors in their resolution No. 68.2.4 and 65.2.4 dated 12th March, 2014. The Petitioner is also entitled to the benefits of TBPS at par with other similarly placed employees of IPGCL. Petition allowed.
Relevant
Union of India vs. Atul Shukla: MANU/SC/0866/2014
Tags : Pay fixation Promotion Benefits
Share :
Top
High Court of Delhi
Renu Gupta Vs. Union of India and Ors.
MANU/DE/1147/2019
02.04.2019
Land Acquisition
Where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, act has to be done in that manner alone
The challenge in present petition is to a Notification dated 15th May, 2017 issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, under Section 3-A (1) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (NH Act) declaring the intention of the Central Government to acquire the land of the Petitioner for the public purpose of "building (widening/four laning etc.), maintenance, management and operation of Dwarka Expressway. Further, challenge is to subsequent declaration dated 20th November, 2017 under Section 3-D of the NH Act. The order passed by the Competent Authority Land Acquisition (CALA) under Section 3-C of the NH Act on 31st August, 2017/6th September, 2017, disallowing the objections filed by the Petitioner, has also been questioned.
The Notification under Section 3-A of the NH Act dated 15th May, 2017 refers to the public purpose as 'the building' of the Dwarka Expressway. While it is true that at this point in time, there was no express declaration of the 'Dwarka Expressway' as a national highway, the Notification was issued within a month thereafter on 23rd June, 2017. A perusal of the said Notification dated 23rd June, 2017 reveals the complete description of the entire highway, which in effect is the 'Dwarka Expressway'.
Section 3-A of the NH Act does not restrict the issuance of a Notification only to an existing national highway. It can apply to a proposed national highway also. While the wording of the Notification could have been clearer, the Court is not persuaded that merely because the Dwarka Expressway had not already been notified as a national highway by that date, a Notification under Section 3-A of the NA Act would be bad in law for that purpose. The declaration of the Dwarka Expressway as a national highway number 248-BB took place within a month on 23rd June, 2017 under Section 2 (2) of the NH Act and the Notification itself says that, the said highway "shall be deemed to be inserted in the Schedule to that Act with the new serial numbers". The Court finds no illegality, therefore, attached to the Notification issued under Section 3-A of the NH Act.
The legal position explained by the Supreme Court in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory to the effect that "where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner alone". In this context, it requires to be noticed that while the actual use of the land of the Petitioner for the public purpose of 'toll plaza' was not mentioned specifically, the toll plaza certainly is a part of the Dwarka Expressway.
The order dated 31st August, 2017/6th September, 2017 passed by the CALA notes that, the Petitioner raised an objection "on the location of the toll plaza within Delhi". It also sets out the clarification of the NHAI that, the location of the toll plaza was away from the urban area and it was best suited to capture the maximum toll-able traffic between Delhi and Gurgaon. The location was also "reasonably away from major intersections and urbanized locations". The Court is satisfied that, there is no illegality in not specifically mentioning the purpose in the notification under Section 3-A of the NH Act or the declaration under Section 3-D of the NH Act that the acquisition was for the toll plaza as long as the main public purpose of the Dwarka Expressway was mentioned.
It is not practical or possible for the Court to put the clock back as far as the construction of the highway itself is concerned. As observed in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory, it is not possible for the Court to reverse the process of the construction of the highway. Consequently, the Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned notifications issued under Section 3-A and 3-D of the NH Act. The petition is accordingly dismissed.
Relevant
Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory MANU/SC/1209/2014
Tags : Acquisition Notification Validity
Share :
Top
High Court of Manipur
Heigrujam Wanglensana and Ors. Vs. The State of Manipur and Ors.
MANU/MN/0022/2019
02.04.2019
Service
There is no bar or prohibition on payment of equal pay despite difference as regards duties and responsibilities but it depends upon wisdom of State Government
By the instant writ petition, the Petitioners have prayed for issuing a writ of mandamus to maintain a parity of pay between the AYUSH doctors and the allopathic doctors working in the State Health Mission Society, Manipur under the NRHM on the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. The short question that arises for consideration by this court is as to whether the AYUSH doctors are entitled to the same pay being given to the allopathic doctors on the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'
In the Manipur Health services Rules, 1982 as amended in the year, 2015, both the AYUSH doctors and the allopathic doctors have been shown in the same grades and they are allowed to draw the same salary under the provisions of Manipur Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 2010. The said rules are made by the expert body after taking into account all relevant factors and even the nature of duties and responsibilities to be performed by both the AYUSH doctors and the allopathic doctors.
Moreover, the Government of India wrote the letter dated 3rd January, 1991 to the States/UTs that, it accepted the recommendation of the Central Council of Homeopathy and that no disparity in the pay scales was maintained amongst the physicians belonging to different systems of medicine and having completed a degree course.
There is no bar or prohibition on payment of equal pay despite difference as regards the duties and responsibilities but it depends upon the wisdom of the State Government. It is the State Government which has not taken keen interest towards the payment of equal pay to the AYUSH and allopathic doctors. The State Government being an institution, ought to act fairly and reasonably and to see that they are treated equally keeping in mind the provisions.
The State Government and in particular, the Respondent No. 3, the State Health Mission Society directed to consider the cases of the AYUSH doctors and take appropriate steps to ensure that, they are treated equally with the allopathic doctors as regards the payment of their pay. Appeal disposed off.
Tags : Pay scale Parity Maintainability
Share :