Supreme Court

State of Jharkhand through S.P., CBI v. Lalu Prasad and Ors.

MANU/SC/0586/2017

08.05.2017

Criminal

Separate charges for distinct offences must be framed separately and cannot be clubbed together for more than one year

Present appeals arise out of three separate judgments of learned Single Judge of High Court discharging three Accused persons namely; Lalu Prasad Yadav, Sajal Chakraborty and Dr. Jagannath Mishra on ground of their conviction in one of criminal cases arising out of fodder scam of erstwhile State of Bihar. Applying provision under Article 20(2) of Constitution of India and Section 300 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. PC), High Court has quashed RC No. 64A/96 against Lalu Prasad Yadav, four cases against Dr. Jagannath Mishra being RC Nos. 64A/96, 47A/96, 68A/96 and 38A/96 and two cases against Sajal Chakraborty being RC Nos. 20A/96 and 68A/96 on ground that they have been convicted in one of cases for offences involving same ingredients with respect to Chaibasa treasury. Issue to be considered is whether legal requirement is for one trial or more than one in facts of present case.

General conspiracy had been hatched as alleged for period 1988 to 1996 but defalcations are from different treasuries for different financial years by exceeding amount of each year which was allocated for Animal Husbandry Department for each of district for purpose of animal husbandry. Amount involved is different, fake vouchers, fake allotment letters, fake supply orders had been prepared with help of different sets of Accused persons. Though, there is one general conspiracy, offences are distinct for different periods.

Article 20(2) of Constitution says that, no person shall be prosecuted and punished for same offence more than once. This is called the doctrine of double jeopardy. There are two aspects of doctrine of jeopardy viz. Autrefois convict and Autrefois acquit. Autrefois convict means that, person has been previously convicted in respect of same offence. Autrefois acquit means that, person has been acquitted on a same charge on which he is being prosecuted. Constitution bars double punishment for same offence. Conviction for such offence does not bar for subsequent trial and conviction for another offence and it does not matter, even if some ingredients of these two offences are common.

Section 300 of Cr. PC refers to Sections 220 and 221 of Cr. PC. No doubt it appears that, a person who has been convicted or acquitted of "same offence" cannot be tried again considering aforesaid provisions. Section 220(1) of Cr. PC provides that, if one series of acts is so connected together as to form same transaction, more offences than one are committed by same person, he may be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence. Section 221(1) of Cr. PC is applicable where it is doubtful what offence has been committed. When a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that, it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved would constitute, Accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences and such charges can be tried together.

When Accused is charged with criminal breach of trust or dishonest appropriation of money or other immovable property, it shall be sufficient to specify gross sum or describe moveable property in respect of which offence is alleged to have been committed, and dates between which the offence is alleged to have been committed, without specifying particular items of exact dates, and charge so framed shall be deemed to be a charge of one offence within meaning of Section 219 of Cr. PC provided that, time included between first and last of such dates shall not exceed one year. A charge shall contain such particulars as to time and place of alleged offence and time period shall not exceed one year. Time period and place of offence is material in such cases. Section 219 Cr. PC provides that, three offences of same kind within a year may be charged together. When a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within a period of one year, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three for same kind of offence under Section 219(1) of Cr. PC.

It is apparent from Section 212 read with Section 219 of Cr. PC that, there have to be separate trials for different years covering period of more than one year. Same kind of offence is a different thing than "same offence" for purpose of Sections 219, 220 or 300 of Cr. PC. Scheme of law is clear that, separate charges for distinct offences must be framed separately and they cannot be clubbed together for more than one year.

In instant case, offences are not same offence. There can be different trials for same offence, if tried under two different enactments altogether and comprised of two different offences under different Acts/statutes without violation of provisions of Article 20(2) of Constitution or Section 300 of Cr. PC. Though there was one general charge of conspiracy, which was allied in nature, charge was qualified with substantive charge of defalcation of a particular sum from a particular treasury in particular time period. Charge has to be taken in substance for purpose of defalcation from a particular treasury in a particular financial year exceeding allocation made for purpose of animal husbandry on basis of fake vouchers, fake supply orders etc. Sanctions made in Budget were separate for each and every year. Each defalcation would constitute an independent offence. Thus, by no stretch, it can be held to be in violation of Article 20(2) of Constitution or Section 300 of Cr. PC, Separate trials in such cases is very intendment of law. There was conspiracy hatched which was continuing one and has resulted into various offences. It was joined from time to time by different Accused persons, so whenever an offence is committed in continuation of the conspiracy, it would be punishable separately for different periods as envisaged in Section 212(2) of Cr. PC, there have to be separate trials. Thus, it cannot be said to be a case of double jeopardy.

Modus operandi being same would not make it a single offence, when offences are separate. Commission of offence pursuant to a conspiracy has to be punished. If conspiracy is furthered into several distinct offences, there have to be separate trials. There may be a situation where in furtherance of general conspiracy, offences take place in various parts of India and several persons are killed at different times. Each trial has to be separately held and Accused to be punished separately for offence committed in furtherance of conspiracy. Concept is of 'same offence' under Article 20(2) of Constitution and Section 300 of Cr. PC. In case distinct offences are being committed, there has to be independent trial for each of such offence based on such conspiracy and in case of misappropriation as statutorily mandated, there should not be joinder of charges in one trial for more than one year except as provided in Section 219 of Cr. PC. One general conspiracy from 1988 to 1996 has led to various offences as such, there have to be different trials for each of such offence based upon conspiracy in which different persons have participated at different times at different places for completion of offence.

Thus, it is apparent that, it is premature to raise plea of issue of estoppel before evidence is recorded for different sets of accusations of different offences for different periods. In what manner the duty has been carried on for different periods would be question of fact in each case and there is no question of double jeopardy in such a case. There is a delay of 113, 157 and 222 days in filing respective appeals by the CBI. Applications have been filed for condonation of delay on account of departmental, administrative procedures involved in for filing special leave petition. Delay has been sufficiently explained and in view of facts and circumstances of case, gravamen of matter and also divergent views taken by same Judge of High Court in same case vis a vis different Accused persons on same question, its duty of Supreme Court not to throw away petition on ground of delay. Explanation offered by CBI of movement of file so as to condone delay so as to subserve ends of justice, deserves to be accepted. CBI ought to have acted with more circumspection and ought to have followed CBI Manual. Impugned judgments passed by High Court are set aside and trial Court concerned directed to expedite trial.

Tags : Trial Discharge Validity

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Supreme Court

Gaurav Kumar Bansal and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

MANU/SC/0583/2017

08.05.2017

Civil

It is for State Disaster Management Authority to constitute one or more Advisory Committee as and when it becomes necessary to do so on different aspects of disaster management

Present writ petitions were filed under Article 32 of Constitution consequent upon un-precedented flood and landslide disaster that occurred in Uttarakhand in 2013. Undoubtedly, disaster led to widespread damage to life, limb and property and according to Petitioners, adverse impact of disaster could have been mitigated had there been effective implementation of Disaster Management Act, 2005 and adequate preparedness by State Government of Uttarakhand. It was alleged in writ petitions that, many of other States were also not fully prepared to deal with a disaster and therefore, necessary directions ought to be given by this Court for proper implementation of Act.

There is no mandate making obligatory establishment of an Advisory Committee. It is really for State Disaster Management Authority to constitute one or more Advisory Committee as and when it becomes necessary to do so on different aspects of disaster management. Consequently, on plain language of Section 17 of Disaster Management Act, 2005, it is not possible for Supreme Court to give any direction as prayed for by Petitioner.

As far as preparation of State Plan under Section 23 of Act is concerned, it has been informed by learned Counsel for National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) that, all States except Andhra Pradesh and Telangana have prepared a State Disaster Management Plan which is very much in place. As far as districts are concerned, it is stated that, District Disaster Management Authority has been constituted in every district under Section 25 of Act and out of 684 districts in country, a District Disaster Management Plan is in place in 615 districts while it is under process in remaining districts.

On a review of steps that have been taken by NDMA, Apex Court is of opinion that, there has been sufficient compliance with provisions of Act and it is not necessary for Supreme Court to issue any particular directions. It is necessary for NDMA constituted at national level and State Disaster Management Authority at State level to be ever vigilant and ensure that, if any unfortunate disaster strikes, there should be total preparedness and that minimum standards of relief are provided to all concerned. However, it would be advisable for NDMA to regularly publish its Annual Report to review and update all plans on the basis of experiences and to make its website ndma.gov.in multilingual so that all concerned may benefit. Supreme Court disposed of writ petitions while acknowledging efforts put in by Petitioners in bringing into focus necessity of implementing statute that might affect any one at any time.

Tags : Enactment Implementation Direction

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High Court of Allahabad

Boney Kapoor and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors.

MANU/UP/1018/2017

08.05.2017

Criminal

Affidavit could only be considered as piece of evidence, when statute permits so

Applications under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC) have been filed with prayer to quash proceedings of Criminal Complaint Case pending before Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, under Section 51 read with Section 63 of Indian Copyright Act, 1957 and Section 403 read with Section 120-B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and summoning order as well as bailable warrant issued and non-bailable warrant passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. Complaint was filed on basis of infringement of copy right.

As was evident in instant matter, script "Raja Bhai IPS" is said to be prepared by opposite party No. 2, (complainant) and same is said to have been sent to Applicants for filmisation. Case of complainant is that, Applicants did not make film, when opposite party No. 2 contacted them. It is also case of prosecution that, stealing the theme and script of "Raja Bhai IPS" Applicants produced film "Wanted". Notice is also said to have been sent in regard to infringement of the copy right on behalf of opposite party No. 2. Complainant was not examined on oath on complaint. Only affidavit in support of complaint has been filed. Concerned Magistrate did not make any enquiry as required under provision of Section 202 of Cr. PC. Summoning order is passed without comparing/matching script of "Raja Bhai IPS" with script of film "Wanted". It is also evident from record that, C.D. of film wanted is available on record but no certificate as required under Evidence Act regarding the truthfulness of C.D. is filed in matter.

Complainant was not examined on oath as required under Section 200 of Cr. PC Settled legal position is that, affidavit could only be considered as piece of evidence when statute permit so. Nothing is mentioned in Sections 200 and 202 of Cr. PC to consider evidence filed in form of affidavit. If ratio laid down in case laws relied upon by applicants and language of Sections 200 and 202 Cr. PC are taken into consideration, it is aptly clear that, it is mandatory for complainant to examine himself on oath under Section 200 of Cr. PC. Thus, it can safely be held in this matter that, Magistrate while considering affidavit filed in support of complaint has committed gross illegality which resulted in miscarriage of justice.

Admittedly complaint was filed within territorial jurisdiction of district Meerut (State of U.P.), applicants were residing in State of Maharashtra, provision inserted in year 2005 under Section 202 of Cr. PC is mandatory in nature, no step was taken in this matter by Court concerned to comply with newly added provision of Section of 202 of Cr. PC, thus, on this score also summoning order under challenge or consequential order passed thereafter becomes illegal. Both parties have admitted that, provisions provided under Chapter XV of Cr. PC is equally applicable to complaint filed in respect of infringement of Copy Right Act also. There is no any distinct procedure provided under Copyright Act to deviate procedure prescribed under Cr. PC.

It might be possible that, theme of film "Wanted" and "Raja Bhai IPS" may be same and it was presented and picturised in complete new manner. Thus, in that situation, no question of violation of Copy Right would arise. Concerned Magistrate ought to have read script and theme of both films and also to peruse/compare the C.D. to form opinion whether there is any act of infringement/violation of Copyright. Since, no effort was made thus the opinion formed by concerned Magistrate about violation of Copyright by applicants is not based on any material and is not correct. Merely similarity in theme/script in two works, it cannot be held that there is infringement of the copy right.

It is also evident from record that, film "Wanted" is produced by S.K. Films Enterprises which is clear from certificate issued by Central Board of Films Certificate. Opposite party No. 2 filed complaint against B.S.K. Network and Entertainment. Nothing is mentioned in complaint that, how applicants are connected with S.K. Film Enterprises. This fact raised by applicants through their affidavit was also not specifically controverted. Thus, on this score also complaint filed by opposite party No. 2 against applicants cannot go on.

Pleas taken by Applicants in present application are acceptable. Applications under Section 482 of Cr. PC allowed. Impugned summoning order as well as entire proceedings of Complaint Case pending before Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate are quashed. Thus, applications are allowed.

Tags : Complaint Quashing

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High Court of Delhi

Naveen Jindal v. Zee Media Corporation Ltd. and Ors.

MANU/DE/1259/2017

08.05.2017

Civil

Court may direct party to suit, in possession of a document, to produce the same during pendency of suit

Present chamber appeal has been preferred by Defendants against order passed by Joint Registrar (Judicial), whereby Plaintiff's application under Section 30 and Order XI Rule 14 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for direction to Defendants to produce documents that is originals of telecasted programme and news article published in DNA within their power, control and possession has been allowed, and Defendants have been directed to produce on oath the documents. Defendant submitted that, onus to prove defamation lies upon Plaintiff.

As per Order XI Rule 14 of CPC, a party to suit, who is in possession or power of a document, may be directed by Court during pendency of suit to produce same. It is not any or every document that, a party may be called upon to produce from his power or possession. Document should be one "relating to any matter in question in the suit, as Court shall think right”. Document of which Plaintiff seeks production, namely original recording of impugned telecast, and original publication of impugned article would, obviously, be in power and possession of Defendants, since Defendants are authors of said works, and they have been telecast/published by Defendants. There cannot be any dispute that, telecasted programme and published news article relate to matters in question in suit. In fact, entire suit revolves around said telecasted programme/publication. There is no dispute about factum of impugned telecast being made, or impugned article being published by respective Defendants. Plaintiff has produced transcript of programme as telecasted. Copy of telecasted programme as well as copy of publication made by Defendant No. 2, even if, produced by Plaintiff, shall constitute secondary evidence. Plaintiff is obliged to cause production of best evidence and only in case the original is not produced, or is not capable of being produced, plaintiff may lead its copy in evidence as secondary evidence.

It is not case of Defendants/Appellants that, Plaintiff is seeking production of documents which are confidential in nature or have proprietary information belonging exclusively to one party, which information such party is entitled to protect from coming into hands of opposite party, who is his competitor. In present case, Plaintiff averred in plaint with regard to telecast by Defendant No. 1 on its TV channel the impugned programme on 13th January, 2015 and publication of news article by Defendant No. 2 in its newspaper on 09th January, 2015. So far as telecast of programme and publication of news article in question are concerned, there is no dispute as said facts have not been denied by Defendants. Therefore, there is no need for Plaintiff to lead evidence with regard to fact that, said telecast/publication had indeed taken place. As to what was the telecast and publication made by respective Defendants, Plaintiff is indeed obliged to lead evidence. But that primary evidence is in power and possession of respective Defendants. Nature of said evidence is documentary. Since, original documents are in power and possession of Defendant, Plaintiff has sought production of the same.

Section 65 of Evidence Act, 1872 provides that, in cases falling in clause (a), secondary evidence of contents of document is admissible. Thus, by requiring Defendants to produce said documentary evidence in original, Plaintiff has merely sought to put in action procedure for leading in evidence content of telecasted programme and newspaper publication made by Defendant Nos. 1 & 2, since Plaintiff is not possessed of primary evidence. Step taken by Plaintiff to seek production of aforesaid documents is a step towards discharge of said obligation by Plaintiff in light of Sections 61 to 65 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Plaintiff by resort to Order XI Rule 14 of CPC is seeking to adopt procedure so as to be able to, eventually, lead secondary evidence, if the need therefore arises. Court rejected Defendant's application under Order XI Rules 12 & 14 of CPC since, Defendant by said application sought production by Plaintiff of records of Plaintiff's bank accounts as well as those of his family members. Court rejected application by holding that, documents sought from Plaintiff are nothing but in nature of fishing and roving inquiry. Court further observed that, it is for Applicant/Defendant No. 1 to adduce evidence of accounts from which monies are alleged to have flowed to Plaintiff and to his family members instead of finding out from bank accounts of Plaintiff and his family members whether they have received any money. In present case, factum of telecast and publication of the offending programme and news article is not in dispute and originals of these documents are in power and possession of respective Defendants. Steps taken by Plaintiff by invoking Order XI Rule 18 of CPC are entirely in accord with prescribed procedure. Appeal dismissed.

Tags : Documents Production Direction

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High Court of Delhi

Quippo Oil and Gas Infrastructure Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and Ors.

MANU/DE/1260/2017

08.05.2017

Commercial

Public interest or change in policy may be sufficient to negate concept of legitimate expectation.

Petitioner, a public limited company, engaged in providing oil and gas rigs on rent with related services, claim that a direction should be issued to ONGC to consider its bid for a tender bearing No. P26AC16006 dated 05th December, 2016 and also seeks a direction restraining ONGC from awarding letter of intent to M/s. Globe Ecologistic Private Limited for said tender. Second Respondent herein owns 100% share holding in Petitioner company and is its ultimate holding company for all practical purposes, including financial criteria mentioned in tender. It is urged that, no other corporate entity holds any share in Petitioner-Company other than second respondent.

ONGC had issued a tender for hire of services for 2D seismic data acquisition in un-appraised "on land" areas of Sedimentary Basins of India for sector 3, 4, 6 & 10. Offer contained the following bid evaluation criteria in tender document for prospective bidder viz, (i) technical eligibility criteria and (ii) financial eligibility criteria. Tender demanded following financial criteria to be fulfilled by bidder for financial qualification viz, (a) turnover of bidders: 30% of annualised bid value or more; (b) net worth of bidder: positive (as per latest audited annual accounts).

It is alleged by Petitioner that, ONGC had made a provision in all its tenders stating that, in event any of criteria (a) or (b) above is not met with by bidder, it can submit its bid on basis of qualification of its 100% subsidiary or 100% parent holding company. It is alleged that, Petitioner did not have positive net worth as on 31st March, 2016, but it had always submitted its bid to tenders floated by ONGC by relying upon positive net worth of its parent holding company i.e. Second Respondent and that ONGC on past occasions had always considered Petitioner's bid by relying upon positive net worth of holding company.

It is not in dispute that, Petitioner was allowed to bid on the basis of the positive networth of its parent company in various tenders before, yet, it is also equally true that with respect to this tender ONGC issued a Circular No. 07/2017 seeking dispensation on issue of negative networth of Petitioner. Bid evaluation criteria for this tender reveals that, it is only in those cases where subsidiary company does not meet financial criteria (viz, turnover of bidders - 30% of annualised bid value) by itself and submits its bid based on financial strength of its parent company, that documents showing positive networth of parent company need to be submitted. However, in present case, interestingly, bidder met standards set in sub-clause No. (i) of Clause 6.0 viz the financial criteria, but failed in criteria (b) above. Therefore, ONGC cannot be said to be at fault in disallowing Petitioner's bid for tender. ONGC's Circular No. 07/2017 is clear on subject and seeks to ensure that, work centres should not put up any case for seeking dispensation on issue of negative networth of Petitioner in future. This cannot, in opinion of this Court, be construed as ONGC's relieving bidders of obligation to comply with eligibility conditions in regard to subject tender. As Petitioner had failed to meet above eligibility criteria, ONGC was justified in rejecting the bid of Petitioner.

In Ram Parvesh Singh & Ors v. State of Bihar and Ors. it was held that, legitimate expectation is not a legal right. It is an expectation of a benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established practice. Term 'established practice' refers to a regular, consistent predictable and certain conduct, process or activity of decision-making authority. Expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid. Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such.

Public interest or change in policy may be sufficient to negate concept of legitimate expectation. Thus, if ONGC had decided that, a subsidiary company applying for tender should have a positive networth, it rather safeguarded compliance of project and hence, acted in public interest. Employer's interest is always in completion of its project rather than to secure financial guarantees for such project.

In present case, condition that, a bidder should have positive net worth was not imposed mid course; it always existed. That Petitioner's bids were accepted and evaluated in past, ignoring such a condition, does not in any manner make it inessential for present tender. As to its premise, Court is not equipped to discern the rationale. Perhaps, it is not enough for public agency to be satisfied that, any possible default can be financially addressed through a guarantee issued by principal or holding company and that alone may not be sufficient. It may wish to safeguard against insolvent contractors, whose lack of lines of credit may imperil smooth performance of contract, or worse - such as seizure or attachment of movable assets onsite. Therefore, insistence on such conditions cannot be belittled, nor can legitimate expectation be pressed into service as an actionable ground.

Court also notes that, Petitioner did not question as arbitrary the condition at time it furnished the bid. Having allowed the bid to stand, even furnished tender, now to seek exemption from condition would be asking Court to direct an unfair consequence, i.e., permit an ineligible bidder to nevertheless be evaluated. Court is satisfied that, neither process of evaluation, nor consideration given to Petitioner's tender, suffers from illegality, lack of bona fides or procedural irregularity. Interpretation given to tender by ONGC is also not arbitrary or unreasonable. Writ petition and miscellaneous application dismissed.

Relevant

Ram Parvesh Singh & Ors v. State of Bihar and Ors MANU/SC/4176/2006
 : (2006) 8 SCC 381

Tags : Tender Grant Eligibility

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High Court of Tripura

Kalpana Majumder and Ors. v. Sankar Debnath and Ors.

MANU/TR/0077/2017

08.05.2017

Motor Vehicles

FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence; it can be used only for purposes of corroboration or contradiction of maker only

Aggrieved by nil award passed by learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, present appeal is preferred by appellant-claimants. Appellant claimed that, accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of driver of said Mahindra Maxx. Police registered a case under Sections 279 and 304-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) against driver of offending vehicle. Appellants, therefore, filed claim petition claiming a compensation of Rs. 26,44,000/- for death of deceased. Deceased was stated to be a fisherman at time of accident and was earning Rs. 9,000/- per month as an income. He was also stated to be 50 years of age, when he met the accident.

Claim petition was opposed by owner of vehicle, who is Respondent No. 1 herein, by filing his written statement. He denied that, accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving. He claimed that, on date of accident, vehicle had valid documents and was driven by its driver, who had a valid driving license and that vehicle was insured with the New India Assurance Co. Ltd., which was accordingly liable to satisfy should any compensation be awarded to Appellants. Insurer also contested claim petition and filed its written statement wherein it denied and disputed claims of Appellants. Question which now falls for consideration is whether there are sufficient evidence to substantiate second part of findings of Tribunal that, deceased and his colleagues were travelling in vehicle in question as passengers at time of the accident and were, therefore, not entitled to compensation as they were gratuitous passengers.

Suggestion, which is denied by the witness, does not carry any weight in the law of evidence. PW-3 and PW-4 are the fishermen who were together with the deceased at the time of the accident and were also hit by the same offending vehicle, but they, unlike the deceased, managed to survive and could tell the tale. The cross-examinations of these two witnesses comprising of hardly three question, that too, only in the form of suggestions, are hardly of any assistance to Respondents.

Pleaded case of insurer in their written statement is that, vehicle in question was not involved in accident or that alternatively, there was no rash and negligent driving of vehicle. It was for first time in witness box, on basis of police investigation report, that insurer took plea that, deceased and his colleagues were travelling in that goods vehicle at time of accident. It is to be noticed that, author of police papers were never examined by insurer to prove their contents. FIR was lodged by son of deceased 9 days after accident, but it was explained therein that, it could not be lodged in time as they were mentally upset due to treatment of his father. Delay in lodging the FIR per se is not always fatal as long as there is credible explanation for delay. It can, therefore, be said that, there is satisfactory explanation for delay.

In Rampati Chakma v. Sunil Kumar Ram and others and in Mahila Dhanwanti and others v. Kulwan and others, it was held therein F.I.R. is a public document, but it is rule of law that, it is not a substantive piece of evidence. It can be used only for purposes of corroboration or contradiction of the maker only. Evidence recorded in criminal Court and findings arrived at thereon should not be used in claim cases. Such evidence, for purposes of claim cases is inadmissible.

In R.P. Gautam v. R.N.M. Singh and another, Madhya Pradesh High Court lucidly summed up proposition of law that, it is settled proposition of law that every civil case is decided on its own facts and evidence without influencing the papers and decision of the criminal case. In such premises registration of offence and police investigation is not a condition precedent for awarding the claim. Besides this due to one reason or another if the first information report of vehicular accident is not lodged with the police or the same was given at later stage and police neither registered the offence nor investigated the same, it does not mean that right of the victim for compensation who suffered the vehicular accident is washed away. The victim remains entitled for compensation on proving the facts and circumstances regarding such accident and factum of injuries sustained by him, he could not be deprived from such right, provided by the Motor Vehicles Act, although such compensation may be awarded only on proving all relevant facts with all probabilities.

Proposition of law laid down in paragraphs extracted in foregoing is squarely applicable to facts of present case. In absence of examining author of aforesaid police papers to prove contents thereof and of keeping in mind glaring fact that, case now being set up by insurer is never their pleaded case, Court concluded that, deceased was not travelling in vehicle in question, but was rather knocked down by it, which resulted in his death. Findings of Tribunal to contrary cannot be sustained in law and are, set aside. However, this Court is not equipped with all necessary evidence to go into quantum of compensation payable to claimants-appellants. Moreover, Appeal is of 2016, it will be more expedient to remand case to Tribunal for determination of compensation by giving parties liberty to adduce evidence/further evidence to substantiate their respective cases. Case is remanded to Tribunal, to proceed with trial of claim petition for sole purpose of determining just compensation payable to Appellants in accordance with law.

Relevant

Mahila Dhanwanti and Ors. vs. Kulwant and Ors. MANU/MP/0011/1994
, R.P. Gautam vs. R.N.M. Singh and Anr. MANU/MP/0514/2007

Tags : Nil Award Compensation Entitlement

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